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5 Abstract 
What makes some local governments thrive while others fall short of answerability? What are 
the different dimensions/indicators/forms of accountability in local governments? What 
factors promote or hinder accountability in local governments? Implicitly, can struggling 
governments be made more accountable? These are some of the over arching questions this 
study attempts to examine as a way for creating firm theoretical and conceptual foundation for 
empirical investigation into the interactions between citizen awareness, local government 
capacity and political history on one hand and local accountability; (namely: transparency, 
participation and complaints and response mechanisms) on the other hand in Entebbe 
Municipal Council and Maracha District. 
Accountability is an elusive concept that is difficult to define but it refers to obligation of one 
party to provide information and/or justification to another and/or face sanctions from the 
second party for inaction or inappropriate behaviour. At theoretical level, the study is 
grounded on the principal-agent model. The citizens here are the principals and local 
government leaders (both appointed/bureaucratic and elected/political) are their agents. The 
major theoretical argument is that, citizen awareness; local government capacity and political 
history affect transparency, participation and the use of complaints and response mechanisms 
in local governments thereby causing variation.  
The study adopts a comparative case study methodology. Primary data was collected using in-
depth interview of 12 respondents and observation from the selected local governments. The 
primary data was supplemented with review of relevant documents namely reports, statistical 
abstract and strategic plans from selected local governments. One major methodological 
challenge is the operationalisation of the elusive variables of accountability, because not many 
empirical studies are conducted on the subject being studied. 
The findings of this study indicate that compared to Maracha District, Entebbe Municipal 
Council has more open and transparent government with better citizens access to local 
government budget, revenue and expenditure, it has annual audit of lower local governments 
and institutions such as schools and health centres, and citizens also have access to access to 
approved work plans projects and tenders. In addition, the municipality has many political 
parties represented on the council. There is also active participation of citizens in public 
meetings and participation in civil society organisations is found to be more active. 
Parliaments Public Accounts committee also has had closer working relations with the 
municipality where corruption cases were investigated. This shows that Entebbe Municipal 
Council is more accountable. The better performance of accountability in the municipality is 
attributed to better communication mechanisms, better capacity of municipality internal audit 
department, better ability to supervise, a long history of leadership and better supervision 
abilities. The study also found out that, the often neglected informal accountability 
mechanisms seem to greatly influence variation in local government accountability and not 
many studies are focused on this in a developing country context. Therefore an empirical 
study focusing on informal accountability in developing country context would enrich the 
literature. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Why are some local governments more accountable than others? The main aim of this study 
is to find out the factors responsible for the variation in accountability in selected local 
governments in Uganda.   
Accountability is seen as one of the gains of decentralization, and a lot of decentralisation 
literature is split along political, administrative and fiscal lines. In this paper, borrowing from 
(Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010) I will adopt a diagnostic framework to draw democratic or 
political and bureaucratic or administrative dimensions together in a coherent manner and 
focus on analyzing the factors behind variation in accountability in Local Governments in 
Uganda.  
1.2 Background to the Study 
The origins of the current local governance in Uganda can be explained by the history of 
public administration and politics in Uganda, which date back to the colonial times. At 
independence, the newly independent nation states inherited centralised systems of 
governance from their former colonizers (Lubanga, 1996:47). However with the Structural 
Adjustment programs that set in, a new wave of events unfolded. Bringing services closer to 
the people became the agitation of many nations not only in the West, but in the developing 
Countries as well. Together with the desire to bring services closer to the people is the NPM 
ideology of moving public accountability closer to the people.  
 Scholars have argued that, decentralisation under the 1997 Local Governments Act, has led 
to more responsive, efficient and accountable local governance in Uganda. The concept of 
accountability entails a relationship between two parties in which one party (the accounter) 
has a duty to explain and to justify his or her actions to the other (accountee), the accountee 
can ask questions and pass verdict, and the accounter can be sanctioned. This definition 
focuses on the important aspects of accountability, as it highlights the significance of a 
relation between accounter and the accountee, stressing the role obligation and sanctions in 
case of deviation. 
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In local governments, citizens are expected participate in electing their representatives whom 
they can hold to account. These representatives are either appointed or elected leaders. We 
shall have a detailed discussion on this relationship in chapter two.  In order to contextualize 
our study, it is worth understanding a brief historical background of local governance in 
Uganda.  
1.3 Brief History of Decentralized Local Governance in Uganda 
The history of Uganda from the colonial period has been patched by different forms of 
governance (Lubanga, 1996:49). There has been emphasis on either centralized or 
decentralized form of governance in Uganda, this pied from one political regime to another or 
even within the same regime.  
The present day Uganda state is a colonial creation. Before colonization, each ethnic group 
had its own independent system of governance. Scholars argue that, like in many parts of 
Africa, Buganda, Bunyoro and other kingdom areas had highly centralized hierarchical 
systems (Kauzya, 2007), while some of the non-kingdom areas such as parts of North, North 
East and South Western had decentralized system, where power and authority was in the 
hands of clan heads, some of whom were elected for specific functions.  
Local governance in Uganda was established even before colonization. The country’s 
decentralisation process has passed through various phases: the pre-colonial phase, the 
colonial phase, and the post-independence Local Governments argues Lubanga (1996). The 
post independence Uganda experienced policy change from decentralisation (1962-1966) 
centralization (1967-1985) and then back to decentralization (1986) to present. The current 
phase of decentralisation was institutionalized by the 1995 Constitution and the 1997 Local 
Governments Act which gave it a legal backing following a series of political and 
administrative commissions (ibid).   
The pre-colonial governance plan changed with the British Colonial Government attempting 
to set up of African (Native) Authority in 1919, as the first local administrations (Lubanga, 
1996:47). This was also the time (1914) West Nile was annexed from Congo Kinshasa 
(present day Democratic Republic of Congo) to become part of Uganda. The African Native 
Authority gave chiefs the clout to collect taxes (revenue), preside over native courts, maintain 
law and order and constitute the native councils at the district and lower levels. In Buganda, 
chiefs were appointed by and were answerable to the Kabaka (king of Buganda) while in 
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non-kingdom areas, chiefs were appointed by and were accountable to the District 
Commissioner (DC), who in turn was answerable to the centre (ibid). Their (DC and King 
and Chiefs) roles are executive, administrative, and at the same time judicial. 
 Immediately after independence, (1962-1966) local governments grew with majority of the 
kingdom assemblies and district council members directly elected. They had powers to set 
their own priorities. It should, however, be noted that this expansion did not go without 
challenges. In 1963, district councils lost powers to appoint their political heads to the centre 
(ibid). In 1967, a new constitution was promulgated, and Local Administration Act was 
enacted, removing local decision making and every power was centralized. During the period 
1967-1985, Centralized System of Administration became the modus operandi. 
The National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986 and this was the peak of 
World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs with its New Public Management reforms. 
Like in many of the African and Asian countries that had obtained political independence a 
few decades ago, the NRM immediately embarked on a decentralization path, starting with 
the election of Resistance Councils (RCs).  Lubanga (1996:50) contends that, apart from 
serving as a political method of empowerment, decentralisation was regarded as a policy 
aimed at improving local democracy, accountability, efficiency intra and inter-district 
equality, effectiveness and sustainability. Accordingly, the 1995 Constitution of Uganda and 
subsequently the 1997 Local Governments Act, gave impetus and legal backing for the 
Decentralized Local Governance in Uganda. Article 176 (1) stipulates that: “The system of 
local government in Uganda shall be based on the district as a unit under which there shall be 
such lower local governments and administrative units as parliament may by law provide”.  
Similarly Article 176 (2) b specifies that “decentralisation shall be the principle applying to 
all local government and in particular, from higher to lower local government units to ensure 
people’s participation and democratic control in decision making” (Uganda, 1995:117).  
Decentralisation in Uganda, was not a local political initiative. Like the rest of the world, 
Uganda’s decentralization came at a time when World Bank through Structural Adjustment 
programs embarked on Decentralization Policy in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world, 
with political and fiscal devolution (Martinez-Vazquez & Vaillacourt, 2011:1). As a recipie 
on the New Public Management reforms menu, decentralisation became a key concept to be 
adopted and followed in the developed and developing countries. Developed States such as 
United kingdom, Belgium, Spain and Italy have had a stronghold on decentralisation (ibid); 
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as most of the developing countries were compelled to take the path of decentralization as it 
became a craze, which was tied to aid conditionality, therefore inevitable.  
1.4 Local Government Structure in Uganda 
The local government system in Uganda is based on the district as a unit, under which there 
are lower local governments and administrative units (Uganda, 1995). There are three main 
types of local government and these are: first the local governments in a district rural area are 
the district council and the sub county councils; secondly the local governments in a city are 
the city council and the city division councils; and thirdly the local governments in a 
municipality are the municipal council and the municipal division councils.(Uganda, 1997).  
The municipal Council is an equivalent of a county. Other lower local governments are: sub 
county and municipal division council local governments. Below this level are the parishes 
and the wards in rural and urban local governments respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Research Problem  
Uganda, like many other developing countries embarked on decentralisation for a democratic, 
participatory, decentralized local government system that could sustain development and 
deliver services efficiently and effectively to the people (MOLG, 2012). Besides transfer of 
power from centre to districts, political control at local level, enhancing local economic 
development and improving local capacity in management of resources, decentralization 
Uganda is divided into 112 districts and has 
one city across four administrative regions 
(Eastern, Western, Northern and Central). 
The government seeks to add another 22 
districts to this number (Mubiri, 2012). 
Most districts are named after their main 
commercial and administrative towns. Each 
district is in turn divided into counties (in 
rural areas) and municipality (in urban 
areas). (MOLG, 2012). City Council and 
District constitute upper local governments 
while Municipal Councils form lower local 
governments.  
Figure 1: the Structure of Local Governments in Uganda 
Source: Steffensen, Tidemand and Sewakambo (2004). Adopted 
from (Kritika Saxena et al., 2010) 
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policy in Uganda envisioned improvement in accountability and responsibility at the local 
level (MOLG, 2012). 
Scholars have argued that, once a country decentralizes; there would be: a) responsive, b) 
efficient, and c) accountable governance at the local level. Despite these claims, most 
decentralization efforts end up without increasing the powers of local authorities or peoples 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999:473-474). Decentralisation seems to have failed to achieve these 
objectives in many cases. For instance, there is little evidence that decentralization in Ghana 
has helped produce a more effective, accountable local government for Kumasi (Miltin, 
2000:8). Similar challenges are reported in the Ugandan media of how service delivery in 
many parts of the country are in a poor state. For instance, Mbale Mnicipal Council failed to 
provide essential services such as garbage collection (Ssalongo, 2011).  
Despite decentralization’s promise for more accountable government, results have been 
mixed at best. The literature on decentralization contains many examples where 
decentralization has not led to greater accountability (Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010:1). In 
Uganda, there some districts are reported to be performing better than others. Gulu and 
Luweero districts were for instance reported to be the best performing districts; while others 
performed poorly (Monitor, 2011) 
The question that we need to ask here is, why do some local governments have better 
accountability performance than others?  (Manor, 2006:288) argues that analysts tend to 
blame the little success of decentralisation on the central governments’ failure to devolve 
power and resources to the local levels. “For a fair test of the promises and failures of 
democratic decentralisation, we need comparative studies that focus on minority of cases in 
which adequate powers and resources have been provided. No one has attampted this. That 
too would renew the literature.” This  is the gap this study intends to address given that all the 
local governments in Uganda receive conditional and unconditional grants. This study will  
particularly focus on why certain local governments are more accountable than others despite 
enjoying the same legislative mandate. 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
Accountability in local governments is now more crucial than ever. The increasing number of 
local government administration units is bringing service delivery closer to the local people. 
But ensuring accountability from the centre for these services is impractical as it is simply 
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impossible for a few staff in central government ministry to monitor the progress of activities 
at every local administrative unit while also keeping with the pace of work at the centre. 
Local communities are, therefore, called upon to be more involved in local government 
performance and service delivery at all levels if quality is to be improved. 
The main objective of the study therefore is to find out why some local governments in 
Uganda have exemplary accountability performance compared to others. Specifically the 
study will focus on: 
 Finding out how local bureaucrats and politicians understand accountability.  
 Finding out the factors responsible for promoting and hindering accountability 
practices in selected local governments in Uganda. 
 Finding explanations of why some local governments are more accountable than 
others. 
 Finding out how the less accountable local governments can be made more 
accountable. 
1.7 Research Question,  
The central question this study seeks to find answers to is why are local governments more 
accountable than others? 
Specifically the study seeks to find answers to the following overarching questions:  
 What are the different dimensions/indicators/forms of accountability in local 
governments? 
 What factors promote or hinder accountability in local governments? 
 Why do some local governments thrive while others fall short of accountability? 
 How can accountability performance be improved in local governments that have 
fallen short of accountability? 
1.8 Significance of the Study 
The study is important for a number of reasons in that: 
1. It will contribute to the existing literature on accountability in decentralised service 
delivery and serve as an impetus for further research into similar areas. 
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2. The study findings will also serve as a recommendation for policy makers on the best way 
to strengthen accountability practices in local governments in Uganda. 
3. It further seeks to highlight the accountability challenges especially in the developing 
countries. 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis: 
The study is divided into seven parts. The first part introduces the the study topic, giving the 
research a brief background positioning this local accountability study in Ugandans 
decentralized local government system. This part also highligts the major research problem of 
why some local governments are more accountable than others. Themajor objectives of the 
research are stated and finally the part ends with an outline of the main sections of the thesis.  
The second part is the theoretical chapter. It begins with theoretical and empirical review of 
the existing literature and ends with the an analytical framework. This gives the study a sense 
of direction for analysis of the empirical data. Its main focus was to position the study within 
the Principal-Agent school of thought, making an attempt to draw explanations for variation 
in accountability in selected local governments in Uganda. Citizens in this study are the 
principals and the local government leaders (politicians and bureaucrats) are the agents. Here 
the main variables of the study are identified and discussed. The dependent variable is 
accountability, which is operationalised as transparency, participation and complaints and 
response mechanisms. The main indicator for transparency is availability and citizen’s access 
to budget information, internal and external reports as well as work plans and approved 
projects and tenders. The main indicators for participation are citizens involvement in local 
elections-seen in leadership change and many political parties being represented on the 
council, attandance of public meetings and council sessions and citizens involvement in 
CSOs and CBOs. The independent variables are citizens/public awareness, local government 
capacity and political history. Public awareness is operationalised as number of 
communication mechanisms and number of CSOs and CBOs. Local government capacity is 
operationalised as proportion of locally generated revenue, human resource capacity in 
internal audit and ability to supervise. And politcal history is operationalised as history and 
leadership. 
The third part looks at the methodology used to study the explanations for variation in 
accountability in local governments. the study used comparative case study design, which is 
presented in this part. Due to time and resource constraints, the study employed mainly 
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qualitative study, using indepth interviews. The advantage of this method is the ability to 
obtain detailed information from the respondents, though use of mixed methods would have 
enriched the study more. data was colected from two upper local governments of Entebbe 
Municipal Council and Maracha District. a total of 12 respondents were interviewed and in 
addition, government documents such as the Constitution of Uganda, Local Governments 
Act, and relevant reports and work plans from the respective Local Governments are used to 
supplement the sources of information. The major methodological challenges of the study, 
which is operationalizing the variables is also pointed out. 
The fourth part presents the data collected. The main focus of this part is the dependent 
variable, therefore the data here is presented and discussed under the subheadings of 
transparency, participation and complaints and response mechanisms, which are the 
operational indicators of accountability. Data from the two local governments is presented 
concurrently in order to bring out the similarities and differences. 
The fifth part focuses on analysing factors responsible for variation. Here the independent 
variables are identified and discussed under the subheadings citizen awareness, local 
government capacity and political history, which are the main operationalizations of the 
independent variable. Here also data is presented from the two local governments. 
The sixth part is a short chapter.   It briefly summarises the main findings in Entebbe 
Municipal Council and Maracha District under the subthemes earlier discussed. It is a recap 
of two chapters: four and five. The aim of this is to bring out a comparative outline of the two 
local governments under study. 
The last part presents the summary and main conclusions in the thesis. Recommendations for 
future research are also made in this chapter. This chapter further points out some of the 
contributions of this thesis to the existing knowledge on Accountability relations in Local 
Governments. 
1.10 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to bring forward the salient issues raised in this study. 
The main argument of the study was to find out the explanatory factors for variation in 
accountability performance in local governments. The main argument was that, depite similar 
legal and institutional framework, accountability performance across local governments will 
varry due to the different perceptions and understandings of the concept accountability.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is subdivided into three main parts. The first presents a theoretical and empirical 
review of existing literature on accountability in order to identify both its promising points 
and shortcomings. The second part is a brief review of literature on the broader 
decentralization reform within which accountability studies in local governments in Uganda 
is examined. And the third part elaborates on an alternative explanatory framework for 
understanding variation in accountability across local governments using the propositions of 
the Principal Agency theory upon which the study is based. Using this model, the researcher 
will construct his own conceptual framework. The study also presents and operationalizes the 
notion of accountability, drawing aspects from perspectives presented by Romzek and 
Dubnick (1987), O'loughlin (1990) and Shakespeare (2010). This study will further be guided 
by the analysis of Mark Bovens. The purpose of this is to position and analyse accountability 
in a broader context.  
2.2 Conceptualizing accountability  
What is accountability? Who is accountable? To whom? For what? How can we tell one 
person or group is more accountable than the other? In whose interest do those who wield 
political authority work? Is it the general public, elected officials, agency heads, clients, 
special interest groups or the future generation? These are some of the questions that this 
study will attempt to answer. Figuring answers to these questions will probably lead us to 
find the explanations for variation in accountability in local governments. (Romzek and 
Dubnick, 1987:229).   
2.2.1 Defining Accountability  
The notion of accountability, like decentralization is subtle; it means different things to 
different people. Brinkerhoff (2004:372) notes that, despite its popularity, accountability is 
ill-defined. Mulgan (2000) on the other hand calls it ‘complex and chameleon-like’ as 
Schedler (1999) observes that, ‘accountability represents an underexploited concept whose 
meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy and whose internal structure is 
confusing’. 
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Despite the disparities in definitions, accountability theories have claimed prominence in 
public administration literature, encompassing three nucleus aspects. At the heart of the 
concept of accountability is first, accountability being a relational term. One party is 
accountable to the other. Secondly, it is looked at in terms of obligation of one entity (person 
or organization) to another. Here the focus is on the provision of explanations for ones 
actions. Thirdly, accountability entails the ability to impose sanctions if actions are deemed 
unsatisfactory(Eckardt, 2008:29, Brinkerhoff, 2004).  
One fascinating definition of Accountability is by Bovens (2005), who defines it as “a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor can be sanctioned”. This definition covers the important aspects of accountability, as it 
emphasizes the importance of a relation between actors and the forum, stressing the role 
obligation and sanctions in case of deviation.  
A more general definition of accountability includes obligation of one party to provide 
information and/or justification to another and/or face sanctions from the second party for 
inaction or inappropriate behaviour.  It takes into consideration holding one party or person 
answerable for one’s actions or in actions. Accountability therefore is the process whereby 
organizations and individuals are answerable for their performance. It requires a clear 
statement of the outcomes required, and who is responsible for achieving them and to whom? 
Who is to take the credit or the blame? Simply put, X is responsible to Y for Z.  
The various definitions of accountability therefore leave one question. What then is 
considered to be accountability? Bovens (2010), has developed what he referrers to as two 
concepts of accountability that is accountability as a virtue and accountability as a 
mechanism. We shall discuss these two concepts in the following section. 
2.2.2 The two concepts of accountability 
As earlier mentioned, Bovens (2010) accountability takes two forms namely accountability as 
a virtue and accountability as a mechanism. He further argues that, these two discourses 
emerged mainly from two schools of thought. 
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2.2.2.1 Accountability ad a virtue 
This view of accountability emerged mainly from the American academic and political 
discourse particularly though not exclusively. In this case accountability is used primarily as 
a normative concept, as a set of standards for the evaluation of the behavior of public actors. 
Accountability or, more precisely, being accountable, is seen as a positive quality in 
organisations or officials. Hence, accountability studies often focus on normative issues, on 
the assessment of the actual and active behaviour of public agents.  
Accountability here is viewed as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the evaluation 
of the behaviour of public actors. Precisely, this group of scholars sees accountability, as 
‘being accountable’; it is seen as a virtue, or a positive quality of organizations’ or officials 
2.2.2.2 Accountability as a mechanism 
The second view comes from the British, Australian, Canadian and a Continental European 
scholarly debate. Accountability is used in a narrower, descriptive sense. It is seen as an 
institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum. 
Here, the locus of accountability studies is not the behaviour of public agents, but the way in 
which these institutional arrangements operate (Bovens, 2010:946). The second school of 
thought sees accountability as social ‘mechanism’, as an institutional relation or arrangement 
in which an agent can be held to account by another agent or institution (Aucoin and Jarvis 
2005; Bovens 2007b; Day and Klein 1987; Goodin 2003; Mulgan 2003; Philp 2009; Scott 
2000) cited in (Bovens, 2010:948).  
This study will draw aspects from these two concepts of accountability as they are both 
useful for the study of and debate about democratic governance. (Bovens, 2010). However, 
the main arguments for the focus of the study will be accountability in the narrower sense (as 
a social relation). In this case one party is obliged to answer to another, and the accounter has 
to have the ‘teeth’ to administer consequences for behavior. These consequences may be 
rewards, in case of good performance or it may be sanctions in the case of deviation. But for 
a better understanding, we need to elaborate more concepts of answerability, obligation, 
judgments and sanctions; which are the building blocks of accountability. 
2.2.3 Accountability as answerability and obligation  
Being accountable entails being answerable. While institutions may look at accountability in 
informational terms, citizens look at it in relational terms. In the former case (informational 
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terms), information flows from the accounting actor(s) to the overseeing actor(s). This 
information ranges from budget information to information on activities carried out. In the 
latter case (relational terms) there is focus on explanation and justification of why the 
accountable, actor(s) acted the way they did (Andrews and Shah, 2003:ix). There is a 
dialogue that takes place in different arena-from personal, private to more public and 
congressional arena. This links exercise of government responsiveness to the “voice” of the 
citizens (Brinkerhoff, 2001). 
There are two types of answerability questions: the first being informational. This can include 
giving budget information, narrative reports of activities or outputs. This type of information 
is unidirectional and flows from the accounter(s) to the accountee(s). The second type of 
information flow goes beyond reporting facts. It questions the justification for actions or 
inactions. This takes place in various arenas, ranging from internal (for example lower level 
managers to their superiors), to agency level (say facilities to insurance health insurance) or 
more public arenas like community meetings where local leaders answer to residents 
(Brinkerhoff, 2004:372). Answerability is thus demand driven, that is the ability of the 
accountee to ask for information from the accounter. 
To be accountable puts a requirement on the actor to explain his or her actions and inactions 
to the forum. This could be formal or informal. Formal accountability requirements take the 
form of court procedures, committee summons among others while informal accountability 
involve obligations on the side of the accounter and this could include press conference and 
meetings among others (Bovens, 2005).  
Obligations on the other hand consist of three elements: First the actor is obliged to inform 
the forum about his conduct, by providing various sorts of information about the performance 
of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures. Secondly, there should be a possibility for the 
forum to interrogate the actor and to question the sufficiency of the information or the 
legality of the conduct of the actor; hence, the close semantic connection between 
‘accountability’ and ‘answerability.’ Thirdly, the forum may pass judgement on the 
performance of the actor. It may agree to an annual account, criticize a policy, or publicly 
censure an official or an agency. In passing a negative judgement, the forum frequently 
imposes sanctions of some kind on the actor. It has been a point of discussion in the literature 
whether the possibility of sanctions is a constitutive element of accountability. Obligation is 
supply driven and its main driving force is the accounter, who is obliged to provide the 
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needed information to the accountee(Bovens, 2005). The actor in this study is the local 
leaders and the forum is the citizens. 
2.2.4 Accountability as rewards, enforcements and sanctions  
Accountability is only effective where the overseeing actor(s) can enforce sanctions or evoke 
punishment for noncompliance, transgressions, failure or inappropriate behavior. 
Accountability without sanctions is weak. Sanctions may range from professional code of 
conduct for example the Leadership Code Act, 2002 in Uganda, exposure to negative 
publicity for human rights abuses of government by civil society organizations for instance. 
But enforcement of these sanctions is what gives ‘teeth’ to accountability; otherwise it 
remains rhetoric (Brinkerhoff, 2001:3).  
Locating where the accountable and overseeing actors are situated either within or outside the 
state is crucial to understanding accountability within a particular governance system. The 
‘accountable’ actor could be located within the state, for example ombudsman, the local 
governments’ accounts commission and public accounts commission. This is what is referred 
to as horizontal accountability. They operate on the principle of separation of powers. 
However, their effectiveness depends on the links to the judiciary that gives them the 
enforcement arm, otherwise accountability remains unenforced. On the other hand the 
overseeing actor may be outside the state. This overseeing actor could be citizens and their 
enforcement power is periodic elections among others. However the citizens ability as actor 
depends on their connection to state agencies or quality of democracy in the country…like 
basic freedoms or they need to have sufficient capacities to allow them enforce accountability 
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:4). Therefore at the confluence of accountability debate is who is 
accountable? To whom? For what? And what are the consequences of non compliance?   
2.2.5 Accountability as an idol  
Accountability is a relatively new concept in Public Management. Its origins can be traced in 
the Anglo-Norman (not Anglo-Saxon literature), around the 13
th
 Century with its roots in 
Business and Economics schools of thought. Literally accountability comes from accounting 
that is book-keeping (Bovens, 2005).  
According to Dubnick (2002: 7-9), the roots of the contemporary concept can be 
traced to the reign of William I, in the decades after the 1066 Norman conquest of 
England. In 1085 William required all the property holders in his realm to render a 
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count of what they possessed. These possessions were assessed and listed by royal 
agents in the so-called Domesday Books. This census was not held for taxation 
purposes alone; it also served as a means to establish the foundations of royal 
governance. The Domesday Books listed what was in the king’s realm; moreover, the 
landowners were all required to swear oaths of fealty to the crown. By the early 
twelfth century, this had evolved into a highly centralized administrative kingship that 
was ruled through centralized auditing and semi-annual account-giving 
This ‘book-keeping’ view of accountability has since changed. Today accountability 
symbolizes ‘good governance’ not only in the public but also private domains. 
“Accountability does not refer to sovereigns holding their subjects to account but to the 
reverse, it is the authorities themselves who are being held accountable by their 
citizens”(Bovens, 2005:183). Accountability has gained eminence in modern public 
administration theory and practice. Bovens (2005:182), looks at the concept both as a 
mechanism and an end. In his own words: 
In the NPM ideology, public accountability is both an instrument and a goal. What 
started as an instrument to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
governance, has gradually become a goal in itself. Nowadays, accountability has 
become a Good Thing, of which it seems we cannot have enough (Pollit 2003: 89 
cited in Bovens, 2005). As a concept, however, ‘accountability’ is rather elusive. It 
has become a hurrah-word, like ‘learning’, ‘responsibility’, or ‘solidarity’, to which 
no one can object. It is one of those evocative political words that can be used to patch 
up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, fidelity, and justice, or 
to hold critics at bay (Bovens, 2005:182). 
Today the concept is compelling to public policy formulators and implementers. It is not only 
appealing in the developed nations such as the US, where for instance over 50-70 Proposed 
Bills to Congress between 2001-2002 had the word “accountability” in their titles (Dubnick, 
2002) but also in developing countries where it has become trendy especially in the 
decentralizing and decentralized nations.  
Uganda is acclaimed as a model for decentralization. The country has institutionalized 
accountability both in central government and in the local government structures. In the 
central government, there are institutions such as Inspectorate of Government, with regional 
offices to oversee local government activities. Similarly, Public Accounts Committee of 
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Parliament oversees accountability at Central Government Level where as all Districts have 
Public Accounts Committee at the District to enforce accountability (Uganda, 1995). 
Accountability has captured the attention of the public; therefore it has become fashionable in 
public institutions, and it is considered key to proper functioning of institutions in the public 
domain.  
2.2.6 Institutionalizing of Accountability: to whom and for what is account rendered?  
2.2.6.1 The concept of Public accountability 
Accountability is a key component in many social relations. This study concerns itself with 
accountability in the public domain, but the question is: what is public accountability? The 
notion of ‘public’ refers to a number of different aspects: First, ‘public’ should be understood 
to mean ‘openness’. Accountability is not rendered in secrecy, behind closed doors, but is in 
principle open to the general public. The information provided about the actor’s conduct is 
widely accessible, hearings and debates are open to the public and the forum publicises its 
judgement. 
Secondly, ‘public’ refers to the object of the account to be rendered. Public accountability 
mainly relates to subjects of public concern domain, such as the spending of public funds, the 
exercise of public authorities, or the conduct of public institutions. It is not necessarily 
limited to public organisations, but can extend to private bodies that exercise public 
privileges or receive public funding (Scott 2000: 41 cited in Bovens, 2005). This also has 
impacts on the accounting perspective. Public accountability therefore entails the rendering of 
account for matters of public interest, i.e. an accounting that is performed with a view to the 
judgement to be passed by the citizens. In general, one could say that public accountability is 
accountability in and about the public domain (Bovens, 2005). It is therefore a social and 
institutional relation. 
2.2.6.2 Accountability as a social and institutional relation  
The concept of accountability as a social relation can best be explained in the context of 
institution. In this discussion, we adopt the definition of institution by March and Olsen who 
argue that institutions can be understood as a relatively stable collection of rules and 
organized practices embedded in structures of meanings and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and changing external circumstances (March 
16 
 
and Olsen, 2006). Institutions are seen as rules and regulations that guide individual actions, 
the structures within which these rules operate and the resources that enable actions to be 
taken. The role of third parties in enforcing these rules and ensuring compliance is 
paramount.  
Political theories focus on politics as a reflection of society; political phenomenon is seen as 
aggregate consequences of individual behavior and choices based on self interest. History 
plays a key role in ensuring unique and appropriate actions by individuals while decision 
making and resource allocation occupy a central role in political life. These theories later 
gave way to the new institutional approach which blends these elements putting emphasis on 
autonomy of political institutions, inefficiencies in history and also importance of symbolic 
action for understanding politics (March and Olsen, 2004). The individual is the central social 
actor in New Institutional approach. Society is thus seen as a collection of individuals. 
Accountability on the other hand involves interactions between individuals in society. 
Accountability is defined as a “relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions 
and pass judgment, and the actor can be sanctioned”(Bovens, 2005). The key elements of 
this definition are answerability, obligation and sanctions (Eckardt, 2008:29) these elements 
call for further explanations and here we shall adopt the analysis of Bovens.  
The actor can be either an individual, in our case an official or civil servant, or an 
organisation. With public accountability, the actor will often be a public institution or 
a government agency such as local government. The significant other, the 
accountability forum, can be a specific person, such as a superior, a minister, or a 
journalist, or it can be an agency, such as parliament, a local council, a court, or the 
audit office, but it can also be a more virtual entity, such as, in the case of public 
accountability, the general public.  
The nature of interaction between ‘the forum’ and ‘the actor’ frequently revolves around a 
‘principal-agent relation’. (We shall elaborate on this model in the later part of this work). 
The forum is the principal, e.g. legislature, who has handed over authority to the agent such 
as a minister. The agent is supposed to account frequently about his/her performance in 
office. This is a peculiar case with political accountability (see Strom 2000; 2003). In other 
accountability relations the forums are not principals of the actors, for example courts in case 
of legal accountability or professional associations in case of professional accountability. 
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The central point here is that in accountability relationship, there must be an “accounter” and 
an “accountee”. The accounter must be answerable, has the obligation to explain his or her 
actions and inactions as well as be judged for their actions. S/he also receives sanctions in 
case of deviation from the expected.  
2.2.6.3 Understanding accountability relationships: to whom and for what is account rendered?  
Brinkerhoff (2001) puts the model of accountability in a matrix with high 
enforcement/sanctions capacity within government and outside, low enforcement within and 
outside government. What is key here is high enforcement institutions tend to be located 
within government while low enforcement tend to be located outside government reaffirming 
the earlier argument of the need to have links with government agencies for accountability to 
work effectively (Brinkerhoff, 2001).  
Figure 2: Typology of Accountability with Illustrative Examples 
 
Source: Brinkerhoff (2001:5) 
In so far as there are different viewpoints, there seems to be one common understanding-
accountability has to do with responsibility for one’s actions and inactions, it relates to one 
being answerable for their actions/inactions. It is the degree to which local governments have 
to explain or justify what they have done or failed to do. Improved information about local 
needs and preferences is one of the theoretical advantages of decentralization, but there is no 
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guarantee that leaders will actually act on these preferences unless they feel some sort of 
accountability to citizens. This accountability can take various forms but local elections are 
the most common and powerful form of accountability, as other mechanisms such as citizen 
councils can have limited influence (DTT, 2012)  
For effective local elections, citizens must participate; therefore to understand the concept of 
accountability better, we need to comprehend it in the light of participation. Participation is 
chiefly concerned with increasing the role of citizens in choosing their local leaders and in 
telling those leaders what to do—in other words, providing inputs into local governance. On 
the other hand, accountability can be seen as the validation of participation, in that the test of 
whether it attempts to increase participation, prove successful, is the extent to which people 
can use participation to hold a local government responsible for its actions (DTT, 2012).  
Besides responsiveness and efficiency, accountability is an expected gain from 
decentralization (Andrews and Shah, 2003:19). Bird, (1993:208) presents accountability as a 
central theme for the benefit of the locals. These gains are expected because government is 
shifted closer to the people. (Andrews and Shah, 2003). With decentralization, transfer of 
authority and responsibility to the decentralized agency enhances accountability to the higher 
authority. This “higher authority” varies depending on whether there is a devolution, 
deconcentration, delegation or privatization and divestiture form of decentralization. (Turner 
and Hulme, 1997:154). In case of devolution, the higher authority is the local population, 
therefore the main mode of accountability is the elections; whereas bureaucracy and other 
legal means tend to take centre stage in the case of other forms of decentralization.  
Accountability takes four different forms namely: bureaucratic, political, professional, and 
legal (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987:228) and it has two dimensions in Public Administration: 
The first dimension Bureaucratic Accountability entails government workers being 
answerable to elected officials (DTT, 2012). This entails management of agency expectation 
through accountability mechanisms and it calls for establishment of some authoritative source 
of control. These sources may be internal or external, formal or informal, hierarchical or 
horizontal relations may be at play (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987:228).  
A second form, Political Accountability involves elected leaders being answerable to the 
citizens who elect them. It is the degree of control over agency choices and operations 
exercised by those sources of control. Accountability has to do with relationship between two 
unequal individuals (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987) This study will try to focus on both 
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bureaucratic and political forms of accountability to get a clear picture of why variation exists 
in Uganda’s local government. The hope of the researcher is to come up with comprehensive 
explanations for these variations. 
The third form of accountability is legal accountability which involves control of a party 
outside the agency members and the fourth form professional accountability entails reliance 
on skilled expertise of professionals such as accountants (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). These 
forms of accountability evolved from the cultural legal foundations, democratic/political 
accountability, and financial accountability and performance accountability notions of the 
concept. We shall not go into a detailed examination of these forms of accountability but they 
are worth mentioning. 
Cultural legal foundations of accountability owe a lot from the 18th century political 
philosophers who argued for the ascendancy of individual rights over those of the state. The 
state relations were looked at in terms of the “social contract” (Brinkerhoff, 2001:7). These 
principles were enshrined in constitutions and became part and parcel of governance. It 
therefore gave the legal institutional framework for accountability. This, however, was not 
the same view in the colonized states that basically looked at accountability as answerability 
to the colonial master. Such conceptions have since changed with the demise of colonial 
governance but the legacy still remains in the bureaucratic influence of the state over 
individual rights and freedoms in the developing countries.  
Democratic/political accountability is seen in terms of oversight of government agencies and 
public officials in their responsiveness to political leaders and to citizens of the public trust. 
These have links to financial and performance accountability. The major argument here is 
that government must deliver electoral promises and be responsive to citizens’ needs 
(Brinkerhoff, 2001:6).  
Financial accountability dimension focuses on compliance with laws, regulations, and 
procedures regarding transparent allocation of expenditure and resource allocation as well as 
reporting of financial resources. The link it has to democratic accountability is that resources 
are used for the agreed purpose. Transparency in resource allocation enhances citizens’ 
ability to participate in oversight. This argument also has links to performance; in that goods 
and services cannot be produced without financial resources, therefore many accountability 
systems join democratic and financial accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001:6).  
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Performance accountability on the other hand entails scrutiny of officials and agencies in 
relation to production of outputs, delivery of services and accomplishment of objectives and 
or achievement of results and impacts. It relates to democratic/political accountability in that 
citizens see whether government is responsive, trustworthy and democratic. These affect 
citizen’s satisfaction with government and therefore determine the outcome of elections. 
Financial accountability on the other hand relates to allocation of financial resources to 
achieving the desired results (Brinkerhoff, 2001:6)  
The focus of my study will be on democratic or political and bureaucratic accountability. 
Bureaucracy is used in this context not to refer only civil service employees and their many 
extraordinary competence but also included political appointees, many of whom come to 
government for relatively short periods of time after successful experiences in the private, 
non-profit sector or even in academia (Rosen, 1998). In Uganda, the president appoints 
Resident District Commissioners to oversee government programs in the district. Such central 
government appointees will be considered in this analysis.  
Improving government accountability improves service delivery, particularly for the poor, a 
point the World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People makes in 
convincing fashion (World-Bank, 2004). Conversely, scholars argue that increasing the 
resources allocated for public services without fixing the accountability incentive structure 
will most likely not translate into greater development benefits for the poor (Venugopal and 
Yilmaz, 2010). If service provision is to benefit the clientele, the intended beneficiaries 
should be able to hold the people responsible to account, thus emphasizing the importance of 
accountability as a social relation at the local level. These arguments presuppose the 
existence of citizens who have all the necessary information and therefore are able to 
determine their destiny. For a good understanding of accountability at the local level, we need 
to look at accountability in the context of decentralized local governments within which this 
study is positioned. 
The main aim of this study is find explanations for variation in accountability performance in 
local governments; therefore it is imperative that we center our attention on some of the 
theoretical arguments on accountability in a decentralized local government. 
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2.3 Accountability, Local Government and Decentralization  
Local Governments are seen as agents for effective management as they are able to solve 
problems effectively. Their key role is seen in identification of problems, setting priorities, 
resource mobilization, implementation of programs, evaluation of results as well as 
maintenance of popular legitimacy with the authority and resources within the available 
institutional framework. Accountability to the population, widespread participation and set 
rules to organize the local affairs are important elements for any local government in order to 
be considered functional (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:7)  
Decentralization is one of the most resonate, yet contentious concepts in modern literature 
and local government administration practices across the sphere. Different theoretical and 
empirical arguments on the concept have emerged. However, the main arguments for 
decentralization hinge around understanding decentralization not only as territorial but also 
functional transfer of power and authority from an individual or central government agency 
to another individual or another government agency that is “closer” to the people. It takes the 
form of deconcentration, which is the shifting workload (without authority) from centre to 
periphery, delegation, which refers to transfer of defined power and responsibility from 
center to other agencies, devolution that is transfer of authority and decision making from 
centre to local units and deregulation (privatization) involvement of private suppliers to 
provide public goods and services (Turner and Hulme, 1997:152)  
Public sector institutions are perceived to be geographically remote and unresponsive to local 
people’s needs, taking decisions without knowledge about the actual problems and 
preferences of the local people (Turner & Hulme, 1997:151). These institutions are riddled 
with inefficiencies. Therefore, decentralization in its various forms gained prominence as a 
panacea to the above inefficient and sometimes collapsed states. This would include grass 
root democratization of political power, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
establishment or re-establishment of effective local governments as well as empowerment of 
local and civil governments (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). The main arguments for 
decentralization include: “proximity, relevance, autonomy, participation, accountability and 
at times democracy” (Turner and Hulme, 1997:151). Scholars argue that crave for 
decentralization is so great that it becomes difficult to locate a country that has not 
decentralized.  
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Proponents of decentralized local governance saw it as a magic potion for all sorts of 
problems that afflicted the developed and the developing countries. It was marketed with its 
theoretical benefits of political education, training in political leadership, political stability, 
political equality, accountability and responsiveness (Turner & Hulme, 1997: 156; Tondnelli, 
1981; Smith, 1985, 18-30). Like the rest of the world, Uganda’s decentralization came at a 
time when World Bank, through Structural Adjustment programs embarked on 
Decentralization Policy in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world, with political and fiscal 
devolution. As a recipe on the New Public Management reforms menu, decentralization 
became a key concept to be adopted and followed in the developed and developing countries. 
Developed States such as United kingdom, Belgium, Spain and Italy have had a stronghold 
on decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt, 2011b:1). This therefore gave the 
policy impetus in implementation and backing.  
Decentralization policy has however not gone without challenges. It is not always easily 
implemented and in-fact many developing countries have failed or are failing to introduce 
effective decentralized governance systems (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt, 2011b:1). 
Despite the enormous amounts of literature on decentralization, there is no universally agreed 
upon satisfactory position on the concept. This has therefore given rise to various individuals 
being interested in analyzing particular countries or a cluster of countries. Manor (2006) 
argues despite decentralization being widely adopted as the “fashion of our times” with over 
60 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America having experimented; many countries have 
gone slow on implementing the policy. Similarly, whereas a lot effort has gone into 
understanding the consequences of decentralization, less effort has gone into understanding 
its causes amidst huge variation in the extent to which countries have devolved fiscal 
resources and expenditure responsibilities to the local and regional governments (Treisman, 
2006). This study will throw light on the different theoretical arguments driving the debate on 
decentralization literature pointing at features of the policy which include:  legislation, 
efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and fiscal health arguments, which Eckardt (2008) 
refers to as preference for heterogeneity and external effects, inter-jurisdictional competition, 
democratic decentralization and local government capture.  
First with legislation, local governance is normally part and parcel of a wider legal 
framework. Decentralization in the 1990’s became out-and-out for many countries to follow, 
although the decentralization path taken varied from one country to another. In India, 
Banladesh, Cote d’Ivore and Ghana for example, devolution was the modus operandi with 
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different levels of state involvement (Turner and Hulme, 1997:172), while Uganda pursued 
the devolution path.  
What is common in decentralization is that, legislation tends to shape the performance 
abilities of the Local Governments. It is important to adhere to such legislative guidelines; 
otherwise its sustainability is compromised. Furthermore, political processes, budgeting and 
procurement processes are typically shaped by the legislative requirements. These legislative 
prescriptions also specify who participates in the budgeting process, when and how. In 
addition, the type of services resources that must be allocated also arise (Andrews and Shah, 
2003).  
Mahmood (1987:12) cited in Turner and Hulme (1997:160) argues that, decentralization 
policy was a blue-print for the newly independent states to follow and has five characteristics 
namely: 
(1) It is a local body that is constitutionally separate from the central government and 
responsible for a range of significant local services. (2) It should have its own 
treasury, budget and accounts along with substantial authority to raise its own 
revenue. (3) It should employ its own competent staff whom it can hire, fire and 
promote (3) A majority elected council, operating on party lines, should decide policy 
and determine internal procedures and (5) Central government administrators should 
serve purely as external advisors and inspectors and have a role within the local 
authority. 
The above blue prints have, however, remained speculative and at times offering no details 
leaving a big gap for variation in the implementation of the policy across countries and even 
producing mixed results within the same country across constituencies.  
Secondly, fiscal health is closely linked to the legislative criteria for generating revenue at the 
local level. A fiscally healthy local government is expected to carefully manage its financial 
resources ensuring that they do not over-spend and that their expenditure is in line with their 
mandate. Local Governments that over-spend are considered poor performers. Poor 
performance is observed from the financial statement of the local government at the end of 
the year (Andrews and Shah, 2003). A well devolved local government should have its own 
treasury, budget, and accounts with substantial authority to raise its own revenue (Turner and 
Hulme, 1997:172). Local taxation, revenue sourcing and “voice” are important elements in 
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decentralization. People exercise their “voice” through local councils. Unfortunately, 
decentralization reforms have generally relied on Central Government remittances to meet 
local demands. (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004) and this has stifled the performance at the local 
level.  
Bird, cited in Andrews and Shah (2003:3.8) argue that, local governments that perform well 
in terms of fiscal health maximize the size of their revenue while at the same time ensure that 
they do not create social inefficiencies. A local government that spends responsibly, has 
reliable and sizeable revenue sources can only be considered effective if it uses such 
resources in a responsive, efficient and accountable ways (ibid, 3.11).  
Thirdly, on eefficiency, scholars have further argued that, one of the factors for countries to 
decentralize is to enable them gain from the benefits of economic efficiency. Arora and 
Norregaard in Andrews and Shah (2003) state that, “ an important rationale to establishing 
decentralized government…is to improve economic efficiency”. Efficiency gains are seen in 
terms of ability, cost and competitiveness. The proposition here is that if services do not meet 
the required standards, citizens can easily voice their disapproval.  
Efficiency is an economic value seen as “maximization” of social welfare (Kee, 2003:6). 
Provisions of public goods are seen to be efficient when local constituents can access public 
services at reasonable costs, without compromising quality. According to Kee (2003), “local 
governments are not only more likely to provide the ‘right’ services, they are also more likely 
to provide these services in the ‘right’ way than are higher level governments”. 
Governments regulate service provision through taxation, subsidies and other service 
packages. Such services should reflect the local needs of the community. Provision of public 
goods can be a challenge due to the fact that, members of a community each have their own 
divergent views on what is essential. This problem is compounded if the community is large, 
like a country. It is therefore easier in a local community to aggregate these needs than in a 
larger group. For example, one health centre in each Municipal Council Division may serve 
more people than one hospital at the national level for reasons of income inability.  It thus 
becomes cost effective to provide such a service at the local level. 
The basic assumption of the ‘cost effective’ argument for efficiency is that, because there are 
many alternative providers, consumers of local government services will always have a 
variety of choices therefore pushing down the cost of services as there is competition to get 
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consumers from the public.   It is presumed that, where quality of services is compromised, 
citizens will air out their concerns therefore ensuring high quality services at all times 
(Andrews and Shah, 2003).  
Ability component of efficiency stands on the premise that, local governments have capacity 
to create and adopt in circumstances where they are faced with competition. It is further 
argued that, when new players (from the private sector) enter to provide services, local 
governments are forced to improve the quality of their services or align their service 
provision to those of the private sector as they take advantage of competition to provide 
quality services to the local constituents. Such is the case of Bamako’s efficiency gains as a 
result of creative productions arrangement between the city and an NGO ‘Jiguli’ (DPLG, 
2000) in (Andrews and Shah, 2003:3.18) 
A strategic illustration of aligning service provisions to those of the private sector include the 
case of Cebu City that looked to NGOs with track records as role models in the provision of 
services. Other interventions include subcontracting, as well as privatization thus creating 
alternative service providers as in the cases of Ramon Aboitiz Foundation Inc and Buenos 
Aires respectively. (Etamadi, 1997:98-99; Hardoy and Schusterman, 2000) cited in (Andrews 
and Shah, 2003). This strand of literature presumes local governments have the capacity to be 
creative and find ways of providing services tailored to suit their local demands. 
This school of thought has however not gone unchallenged. Not all local governments 
provide services efficiently. In Uganda for instance, while decentralization programme 
clearly represents a radical attempt at building capacity at the lower levels and improving 
democratic accountability and service delivery, it has to date, been plagued by inefficiency, 
scarcity and poor performance (Watt et al., 2008). Similarly, studies in the city of Bamako in 
Mali show inefficiency in the management of public sanitation, with streets becoming 
dumping ground for liquid waste DPLG (2000) in (Andrews and Shah, 2003:3.17). Such 
scenarios provide mixed results for the public decentralization at the local level, the causes of 
which ought to be established. 
Fourthly, arguments for responsiveness presume democratic participation. Andrews and Shah 
(2003) cited Inman (1979:278-279) argue that, democratic decentralization should lead to 
better participation and take into consideration the local demands. Local political leaders 
have to fulfil popular demands and this serves as the basis for their re-election. Simply put, if 
local leaders do not take into account local demands, they risk losing their political positions 
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the subsequent elections. This is the basis for the strong theoretical advocacy for 
decentralized local governments.  
Local governments are seen to be close to the populace and therefore able to provide services 
that suit the local needs unlike the remote central governments, whose failure to respond to 
local demands is partly responsible for this theoretical argument in favor of local government. 
Responsiveness is said to influence local governments’ contribution to the welfare to their 
respective constituencies. Scholars argue that, local governments are better placed to provide 
the right services to their people as they are well versed with the local needs compared to the 
higher level governments (Andrews and Shah, 2003). Decentralization is thought to enhance 
political participation and this has the potential to enhance democratic values and political 
stability at the local level. Through local debates, local priorities are set and implemented. It 
is also argued that local governments can offer training opportunity for future leaders (Kee, 
2003). 
Looking at fiscal decentralization, participatory budgeting involves discussion and debate 
with the local members of the public about investment budget. Decisions of the groups in 
these discussions are legally binding on the local governments (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004:74). The district Council has to show evidence of direct consultation with the citizens 
when using the funds. This is a shift from the traditional top-down approach (Andrews and 
Shah, 2003:3.14). A local government should employ its own competent staff whom it can 
hire, fire and promote to achieve this participation (Turner and Hulme, 1997:160). 
The participation notion is based on the assumption that people can make the best choices for 
themselves and will always make rational choices. Democratic participation can be analyzed 
at two levels: the level of local political involvement in resource allocation and the level of 
civic participation in decision making (Andrews and Shah, 2003:3.12). Results have been 
mixed at best; where as some local governments show improvement in responsiveness, others 
have continued to choke under the weight of central government imposition of policies and 
agenda. 
One strand of literature shows that, responsiveness to local demands is stifled by central 
government directives to local governments. Studies have shown that not all local 
governments are responsive to local people’s demands. Such is the scenario in the municipal 
case of governments in South Africa where observers found out that “spending decisions are 
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often directed by bureaucratic agenda and citizens input are limited (Andrews and Shah, 
2003:3.12).  These are the findings of Mitlin (2000:8) in Andrews & Shah (2003:3.13) who 
found out that central government influence impedes local responsiveness.  
Participation at times is idealized in the institutional structures. However, local 
administrators, due to corruption and personal ravenousness, stifle local participation. In 
South Africa for example, local administrators are required to involve citizens in the 
budgeting process but seldom do so. Local bureaucrats at times do selectively, and involve 
those they choose to. There is also evidence that even when local people are seemingly 
involved, their views are seldom implemented (Andrews and Shah, 2003, Turner and Hulme, 
1997). 
Contrasting thread of literature indicates that, decentralization can at times lead to better 
participation in service provision. A case in point is Costa Rica where exercise of 
discretionary powers in local governments led to improved participation at least in service 
provision (Andrews and Shah, 2003). 
2.3.1 Development of Decentralised Local Government Accountability  
2.3.1.1 Global trends 
Decentralization especially offers significant opportunities to improve government 
accountability. It creates the possibility of exerting stronger pressures on government 
performance both from below (the demand side) and from above (the supply side). 
Decentralization reshapes power relations among the local residents, local governments, 
producers of local government services, and higher levels of government (including central 
government). It sets new rules of the political game, helping new local leaders to emerge in 
the political competition. It thus redefines the interactions between local leaders and their 
constituencies. As a result of new regulatory and financial powers over procurement and 
service delivery, the decisions and actions of local governments have a greater impact on 
local economies; decentralization thus leads to new interactions and contractual relationships 
between local governments, small and big private firms, providers and producers of services, 
and communities and nongovernmental organizations(Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010).  
Decentralization reforms have a close relationship with accountability to the local people 
through local elections, which are more likely to be driven by resource allocation at the local 
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level (Kee, 2003:7, Eckardt, 2008). Leaders who do not deliver are likely to lose their 
political seats. Together with responsiveness and efficiency, accountability is often is seen as 
an expected gain from decentralization (Bird, 1993). The main presumption of the argument 
for accountability at the local level is that, the local people have the capacity to call their 
representatives to account for their actions. It also pre-supposes adequate access to 
information; therefore the need and access to these for channels through which they can 
monitor and evaluate such challenges. Evaluation of accountability also calls for innovation 
at the local level (Andrews and Shah, 2003).   
These innovations and the competing interests of the need of power sharing, responsiveness, 
accountability, tax competition as well as coordination have come with new challenges for 
local governments. Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011a:3) argue that fundamental 
flaws in the design of decentralization system, weak central government institutions, 
resistance from tribal elites, impact of the history and colonial influence, reluctances in 
central authorities due to fear of loss of political control as well as imperative of “union of 
federalism all pose a challenge to the implementation of decentralization. Treisman  
(2006:10) identifies ethnicity, country size, colonial history, economic development, 
democracy and federalism as well as decentralization as factors that account for the success 
or failures of decentralization.  
The performance of any Local Governments is determined by the level of fiscal discipline, 
evident in financial management practices. Conformances to legislative process, fiscal health, 
responsiveness, efficiency as well as accountability are explanations for effectiveness of the 
Local Governments (Andrews and Shah, 2003). These are the wiles fronted for 
decentralization. As many analysts turn their attention to participation and efficiency 
arguments, contrary views to local accountability tends to receive less attention. 
Scholars argue that there are many numerous competing interests at the local level; different 
interest groups tend to compete for attention and recognition. The main argument of the local 
capture is that, due to competing interests at the local level, it is at times hard to achieve true 
decentralization and accountability. Eckardt (2008:56) contends that decentralization may 
actually strengthen “distributional coalitions” that may impede true political accountability.  
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2.3.1.2 The case of Uganda 
In Uganda the political leadership at the local level is democratically elected, thereby drawing 
the major part of their power from the local level. This phenomenon is referred to as 
downward accountability. Uganda is acclaimed as a success story in developing local 
government sovereignty in areas such as setting priorities and budgeting, service provision, 
staffing and management organization.  
Elected Local Government Councils which are accountable to the people are made up 
of persons directly elected to represent electoral areas, persons with disabilities, the 
youth and women councilors forming one third of the council. The Local Government 
Council is the highest political authority in its area of jurisdiction. The councils are 
corporate bodies having both legislative and executive powers. They have powers to 
make local laws and enforce implementation. On the other hand Administrative Unit 
Councils serve as political units to advise on planning and implementation of services. 
They assist in the resolution of disputes, monitor the delivery of services and assist in 
the maintenance of law, order and security (Uganda, 2012). 
Despite these claims, there is still a notable challenge in areas of fiscal accountability, 
revenue generation and collection as well as influence on land use and physical planning. The 
central government tends to tie grants and donations to national priorities, leaving little room 
for local priorities thereby increasing accountability towards to the central government 
(World-Bank, 2003).  
Citizens participate in elections by voting their preferred leaders, public hearing and 
information sharing fora. They also expected to participate in local budget framework, but 
this seems not to be the case in practice.  NGOs in Uganda are given a place on the district 
and local environmental committees. This gives impetus to the importance of plurality of 
voices and representative democracy (World-Bank, 2003). However actual participation in 
local political accountability is what needs to be studied.  
2.4 Theory for understanding Decentralization and Accountability 
2.4.1 Introduction  
It is a common practice to analyze accountability relations using principle-agent models. The 
agency models are part of the rational choice institutional school of thought (Eckardt, 
2008:61). Fearon (1999) in Eckardt (2008) argues that, “relations involving accountability are 
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agency relations, in which one party is understood to be an ‘agent’ who makes some choices 
on behalf of the ‘principal’ who has powers to sanction or reward the agent”.  
2.4.2 The Principal-Agent Model 
Originating from disciplines such as law, finance, accounting, and economics, the model has 
become the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials (see 
Mitnick 1973, 1975, and 1980; Moe 1982, 1984, and 1985; Wood 1988; Wood and 
Waterman 1991, 1993, and 1994; Scholz and Wei 1986) (Waterman and Meier, 1998:173).  
 
Howlwett, Ramesh and Perl (2009:167) look at such principal-agent relationship that exist 
between politicians and their counterparts, the bureaucrats. They cite cases where changes in 
social conditions may affect the interpretation of a policy problem, necessitating the 
adjustment of such policies thus altering implementation or stifling it altogether. Here, 
implementation may change without necessarily change in the policy itself, therefore the 
bureaucrats resort to selective application of the law at their discretion. Such occurrences 
happen because it is the agents, the bureaucrats who have the necessary information at their 
disposal, therefore becoming a breeding ground for conflicts between the principal (s) and the 
agent(s).  
 
The Agency Model has two major assumptions: First, that there is a conflict of goals between 
the principal and the agent. This assumption is based on the premise that, principals and 
agents each have competing interests. Kiewitt and McCubbins in Eckardt (2008:62) observe 
that, the only restriction on agents (who are seen as self seekers) is their relationship with 
their principals.  
 
The second assumption is that agents have more information than their principals, which 
results in unevenness of information between them. The implication of this is that, agents will 
always try to exploit this information to their advantage to satisfy their own self-seeking 
behaviors. The insinuation of this supposition with accountability is that, although there may 
be accountability framework, agents will take advantage of this to hide information and use it  
for their personal benefits. 
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2.4.2.1 Limitations of the Principal-Agent Model 
 
One major agency problem identified by researchers is the tendency for the agents to identify 
more with the needs of those who are regulated than with the interests of the principals 
(Howlwett et al., 2009). Bernstein (1995) in (ibid) sees this as one of the factors that trigger 
the demise of the regulatory structure, thus creating breeding grounds for policy failures. This 
complexity has also given rise to new insight into policy designs that take into consideration 
offering better chances for policy success, thus avoiding the pitfalls of distortion of policy 
outcomes. The question that we need to ask is whether such relationships exist at all times 
between the principals and their agents, but that is not the main focus of this study. 
 
We shall consequently see through the agency model lens in order to observe some of the 
factors responsible for accountability performance variation in Uganda’s Local Governments. 
This will form the foundation of our analysis.  
2.4.2.2 Application of the Model 
In light of this model, citizens who are the principal; are expected to hold their leaders 
(appointed and elected bureaucratic and political leaders) to account. This model will 
therefore be used to analyze accountability relations in the selected local governments of 
Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District. 
 
Accountability is a key concept in the in public sector management and administrative 
reforms which have placed it at the centre of democratic reforms. The World Development 
Report (2004) places emphasis on accountability as a fundamental concept in public service 
delivery (Eckardt, 2008:29).  The report gives a framework to analyze accountability 
relations in the public domain.  
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The argument here is that citizens are at the centre of accountability. Therefore empowering 
poor citizens (who are the principal) by increasing their influence in policymaking and 
aligning their interests with those of the non poor can hold politicians and their bureaucratic 
counterparts (the agents) more accountable for universal service delivery. Citizens’ voice can 
be increased through participation in elections, which is their main tool for rewards and 
sanctions. 
 
Elections, informed voting, and other traditional voice mechanisms should be strengthened, 
because these processes—and the information they generate—can make political 
commitments more credible, helping to produce better service outcomes(Brandeis, 2004).   
Community Based Organizations, Nongovernmental and civil society organizations play a 
crucial role in augmenting the voices of the poor. They mobilize and coordinate citizens’ 
coalitions to overcome their collective action problems, mediate on their behalf through 
redress mechanisms, and demand greater service accountability. Membership to these 
organizations strengthens citizens’ knowledge of their rights. Even when these measures have 
limited scope, better information—through public disclosure, citizen-based budget analysis, 
service benchmarking, and program impact assessments—and an active, independent media 
can strengthen voice(Brandeis, 2004) 
 
Figure 3: WDR Framework of Accountability and Service Delivery 
 
Source: World Development Report 2004.  
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Scholars argue that, in fact, elections provide citizens with both answerability (the right to 
assess a candidate’s record) and enforceability (vote the candidate in or out) of political 
office. (Brandeis, 2004).  In Uganda there are three groups of categories of actors in Local 
Governments, who are grouped into two for purposes of this study: the citizens on one hand 
and, the elected leaders and the bureaucrats on the other. The citizens form the bulk of the 
critical mass and they elect leaders who represent them.  They are expected to hold these 
representatives accountable for their actions and in actions. One common way of holding 
leaders accountable is through elections as observed by Brandeis (2004). The constitution of 
the Republic of Uganda, 1995 gives powers to the citizens to elect people who will represent 
them within the local government set up. It is assumed that citizens make informed decisions 
on who should lead them.  
 
The political leaders through their sectoral committees, such as the Local Government Public 
Accounts Committees hold their bureaucratic counterparts accountable. This accountability 
feeds back to the citizens who voice their demands through their political representatives. The 
local governments of Uganda have a network of accountability specific organs ranging from 
internal audit function which is embedded within the technical arm of local government 
structure, to the office of Inspectorate of Government, whose main task is to investigate 
corruption cases in the public offices in both local and central governments. 
 
The problem with preceding arguments is that it neglects the fact that leaders tend to pursue 
their own interests, therefore conceal information from the citizens. For instance, a racket of 
fraud in the local government department will be kept discreet, making it impossible to assess 
the said record. Secondly, the elected leaders always find a way to bribe the poor voters, thus 
immobilizing the citizens’ ability to enforce their voting powers in case of poor 
accountability. 
 
The case of accountability in Uganda like elsewhere emphasizes three components namely: 
that is answerability, obligation and sanctions in case of unsatisfactory performance, (these 
were discussed earlier). This study in line with these three aspects will focus on transparency, 
participation and complaints and response mechanisms as the dependent variables for the 
study. These three are part of accountability framework with four dimensions of 
transparency, participation, evaluation and complaints and response handling for the 
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operationalzing understanding of accountability in organizations.  I adopted this framework 
with modifications to operationalize the dependent variables for this study.   
 
This Global Accountability Framework was developed specifically for transnational actors in 
Multinational Organizations. However, it is argued that, the framework could be used for 
assessing whether national actors, such as, government departments or local councils, are 
accountable on the basis of the same dimensions, although this would require adaptation of 
the various operationalisations and indicators to fit the specific political and institutional 
context of these types of actors (Bovens, 2010:960). We shall therefore explain the 
measurements and indicators which were used in this study in the selected local governments 
in Uganda.  
 
The cardinal aim of this study is to find out why there is variation in the performance of 
accountability in the elected local governments in Uganda. To achieve this objective, the 
study attempts to find the connection between the level of awareness, capacity, political 
history and accountability. The dependent variable in this study is accountability. The major 
explanatory variables are awareness, capacity and political history. The study tries to hold 
constant some variables that are known to affect performance and accountability in local 
governments. These are first presented in the conceptual framework, and then followed by a 
detailed explanation of what is covered under each operationalisations and the measurement 
used by this study. For clarity, it is worthwhile to look at the Conceptual Framework which 
shows the interaction of the variables. 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
Many local governments are more accountable than others. To understand why there is 
variation, we need to first establish whether there is accountability in these local 
governments. Accountability which is sanctity placed in local government management 
comprises of (1) transparency, which is operationalized as  availability of and access to 
reliable information by both citizens and local government leaders; (2) participation which is 
operationalized as (i) citizen and their leaders joint participation in village meetings, (ii) 
attendance of council meetings by most of the councilors and citizens, (iii) having many 
political parties represented at the local level (iv) the number of civil society organizations 
(CBOs) and (3) complaints and response mechanism within the local government which is 
operationalized as (i) procedures to register complaints from citizens, (ii) mechanisms to 
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respond to these complaints. This takes into account the role of both the internal and external 
observers. 
The major explanatory variables for this study include: (1) public awareness which is 
operationalized as (i) availability of free and accessible communication means/media; 
(2)local government capacity which is operationalized as (i) the proportion of local 
government revenue generated locally that is locally generated revenue, (ii) capacity of 
human resource in the internal audit department and (iii) ability to supervise bureaucratic 
staff measured by the average level of formal education and (3) political history of the local 
government which is measured by the number of years the local government has been in 
existence. The interaction between these variables is explained in the model below. 
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Figure 4: Conceptual Frame Work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own design 
2.6 Elaborating the Dependent Variable: Indicators of accountability 
In this section, we discuss in details the operationalized dependent variables. The aim of this 
is to give the work clarity to the concepts used in particular relation to this study. 
2.6.1 Transparency 
Transparency means different things to different people, but for purposes of this study, it 
refers to the provision of accessible and timely information to stakeholders and the opening 
up of organizational procedures, structures, and processes to assessments by the stakeholders. 
Doing so enables stakeholders to monitor an organization’s activities and hold it to account 
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for its commitments, actions, and decisions (Lloyd et al., 2007). Transparency is closely 
related to answerability and obligation. 
 
Lack of transparency in budgetary procedures and outcome makes it hard for the electorate to 
judge government spending records (Healey and Tordoff, 1995; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001). 
Cited in (Devas and Grant, 2003), yet this is a common occurrence in most of the local 
governments. There are different mechanisms of official accountability to the public—
elections, political parties, civil society, the media, public meetings, formal grievance 
procedures and opinion surveys-but each of these has their own problems (Blair, 2000:32). 
The mechanisms that are used vary from one local government to another. However they all 
tend to hinge around availability and public access to government functioning that is 
government openness. 
 
Government openness is defined as the information that the government releases, i.e. the 
extent to which governments publish information electronically or make available, as well as 
the extent to which citizens can demand and receive information not published proactively. 
Studies interested in government openness sometimes use the existence of access to 
information (AtI) laws (see  Relly 2010) to capture this dimension (Bauhr and Grimes, 2012).  
Government openness in this study is operationalized as availability and citizens’  access to 
information.  
 
Uganda did not have a disclosure law until 2005. However in the 1995 constitution drafted in 
an effort to restore democratic governance, the government recognizes that the citizens have a 
right to access of information in the possession of the State. A practical example of “teeth” of 
this law was in a case where in 2002, the High Court compelled Government of Uganda to 
make public details of agreements it had signed a year earlier (in 2001) with AES Nile Power 
Limited for construction of a Hydro Power Dam at Bujagali. The Uganda Environment 
Group Greenwatch backed by California based International Rivers Network sued the 
government for withholding details of the Agreement. Greenwatch had claimed that, the dam 
would ruin the culturally important Bujagali Falls. Government had initially refused to make 
public details of the agreement but later AES Nile Power withdrew from the project (Roberts, 
2006). 
This openness in turn is evidenced by well organized records and a professional civil service 
(Roberts, 2006). Scholars further argue that responding to citizen requests for information 
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requires well worked out routines for saving documents and making them available for the 
public which can be costly in terms of monetary and human resources (Grigorescu 2003; 
Fenster 2006; Neuman & Calland 2007; Roberts 2006) cited in (Bauhr and Grimes, 2012) 
constitute government openness.  
Therefore government openness is measured by:  
 availability and public access to local government revenue and expenditure 
 availability and access to internal and external audit reports 
 availability and access to government work plans, approved projects and tenders 
All these were considered as indicators of availability and access to information.  
 
Other studies consider whistle blower protection legislation as fundamental conditions upon 
which disclosure of abuses of power rests. Whistle blowing is “the disclosure by organization 
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of 
their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Miceli & Near 
1992; see also Miethe & Rothschild 1994; Dworkin 2002) cited in (Bauhr and Grimes, 2012). 
Whistle blower protection allows individuals to disclose information despite their individual 
connection to, and vulnerability to retaliation from, that in power. This study did not examine 
whistle blowing; however, it remains an important tool for further studies in the field of 
accountability and transparency in the developing countries. 
2.6.2 Citizens participation 
Participation entails active engagement of both internal and external stakeholders in the 
decisions and activities that affect them. As a minimum requirement, participation must 
include the ability to influence decision making and not just seek approval or acceptance of a 
decision or activity (Lloyd et al., 2007).  
 
It is hard for democratic authority at the local or national level to succeed unless public 
servants are held accountable. Local Government employees must also be accountable to 
elected representatives, and representatives must be accountable to the public. The effective 
tool used in bureaucratic accountability is supervision. On the other hand elected leaders are 
checked by the public using elections as the main mode of accountability (Blair, 2000).  
 
In many developing decentralizing democracies accountability faces a number of challenges 
in that, the regime may decentralize but not completely. In Uganda for example, all district 
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workers are recruited at the local level but they receive their salaries and other emoluments 
through Central Government’s Ministry of Public Service. Such moves not only make it hard 
for the local political leaders to hold local government bureaucrats to account but also 
complicate problem solving at the local level. The cause of this trend are either the central 
government’s reluctance to decentralize or the reluctance on the side of employees to be 
decentralized. 
 
Citizens hold local political leaders accountable through periodic elections. The theoretical 
assumption here is that, non performing leaders are removed from the office. This gives rise 
to high local leader turn over/leadership change as an indicator. However in developing 
democracies, election processes are state managed by the influential politicians who buy their 
way out. Such make it hard for the largely poor citizens to hold them to account. Nevertheless 
elections by large reflect public will (Blair, 2000:27) 
 
In many systems, opposition political parties are a powerful engine for enforcing 
accountability. The party in power most often has strong incentives to evade accountability, 
but opposition parties have their own incentives to uncover wrongdoing by the ruling regime 
and publicly hound incumbents for their misdeeds. They present a constant vision of a viable 
alternative for doing public business different and perhaps better way. Such a visible 
alternative helps keep the party in power on a path of political morality (Blair, 2000). Though 
the challenge is that, opposition in many developing democracies is too weak to influence the 
ruling government. However, they help keep government in check.  
 
Public meetings in many countries have been instituted to insert civic opinion into local 
governance. In Ukrainian for example mayors have launched public budget hearings, and in 
the Philippines, public hearings have become common for many local government bodies. In 
both countries, local council meetings are open to the public. Such meetings form a powerful 
accountability tool for the citizens. Similarly in Uganda, the Constitution and the Local 
Governments Act provide for such meetings to help citizens hold their leaders to account. 
 
Precisely the indicators for participation adopted by this study for participation are: 
 Evidence of change of leadership in the previous elections 
 Evidence of vibrant and many opposition parties on the local council 
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 evidence of public meetings involving both citizens and local leaders 
 and evidence of active participation in many political parties 
2.6.3 Complaints and response mechanism 
Complaint and response mechanisms are channels developed by organizations that enable 
stakeholders to file complaints on issues of non-compliance or against decisions and actions. 
They also ensure such complaints are properly reviewed and acted upon. Transparency, 
participation, and evaluation processes are used to minimize the need for complaint 
mechanisms. Complaint and response mechanisms are accountability processes of last resort 
(Lloyd et al., 2007) and can be used when all the other accountability channels have failed. 
Formal grievance procedures are instituted in functional developing decentralizing 
democracies. In Bolivia, formal procedures are useful for citizens to redress grievances 
against elected officials.(Blair, 2000).  
 
Uganda has perhaps one of the most comprehensive legal frameworks in dealing with 
accountability issues in government departments. The laws provide for a number of 
institutions that are expected to provide receive, investigate and provide accountability in 
local governments. We shall discuss some of these legal provisions in the subsequent 
paragraphs 
 
The Inspectorate of Government (IGG) is one of the institutions that is to help redress 
citizen’s grievances and prosecute corrupt public officials through their regional offices. The 
Inspectorate of Government Act, 2002 gives the institution the power for receiving and 
investigating complaints or allegations under this Act. These complaints and allegations may 
be made by an individual or by any body of persons whether corporate or not, and shall be 
strictly confidential and addressed to the Inspector-General. The law also provides that  
Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law, where a prisoner, or an employee 
in a public office, makes an allegation or complaint to the Inspectorate under this Act, 
the allegation or complaint shall not be made through, subject to the scrutiny of the 
prison officials or the immediate supervisor or employer as the case may be (Uganda, 
2002). 
 
The inspectorate of government is then expected to summon any person, who in the opinion 
of the Inspectorate is able to give information relating to any matter relevant to the inquiry 
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being conducted by it, to appear before it and to furnish information and produce any 
documents, papers or things that may be in the possession or under the control of that person; 
in consequence also send reports every six months to the parliament and the president who is 
expected to take appropriate action as they deem fit (Uganda, 2002). The law is however 
silent on how the aggrieved party or complainant is given feedback 
 
Local Government Public Accounts Committee: Another institution mandated with 
accountability in local governments in Uganda is the Local Government Public Accounts 
Committee that is selected from among the councilors. Local Governments Act 1997, Section 
88 (7) provides that a local government public accounts committee shall examine the reports 
of the Auditor General, chief internal auditor and any reports of commissions of inquiry and 
may, in relation to the reports, require the attendance of any councillor or officer to explain 
matters arising from the reports. Section 88 (8) directs local government public accounts 
committee to submit its report to the council and to the minister responsible for local 
governments who shall lay the report before Parliament (Uganda, 1997).  
 
The Auditor General: Section 13(1), Article 163(3) of the 1995 constitution as amended and 
the National Audit Act, 2008 (NAA) amplifies the mandate and functions of the Auditor 
General. One of the main functions of the office includes undertaking financial audit and 
reporting on all public accounts in respect of all public offices including courts, the central 
and local government administrations, universities and public institutions of like nature and 
any public corporation or bodies or organizations established by an Act of Parliament in 
accordance with laws which govern them (Uganda, 1995, Uganda, 2008).  
 
Internal Audit Department: Section 90(1), of the 1997 Local Government Act demands every 
district, city, municipal or town council to provide for an internal audit department. The head 
of the internal audit department is directed to prepare quarterly audit reports and submit them 
to the council giving a copy to the local government public accounts committee who are 
expected to discuss these reports (Uganda, 1997). 
 
All these laws put in place mechanisms for registering complaints and receiving feedback. 
The challenge however seems to be the fact that, despite decentralizing provision of services 
and implementation of government programs, little is put in place as a way of legal 
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requirement for downward accountability. This has in turn led to pursuance of informal 
mechanisms of accountability to the citizens, from whom the political leaders obtain their 
mandate. Some of the institutions are operating with limited human resource capacity while 
citizens have limited knowledge of their role in holding local governments accountable. 
These are the challenges we shall discuss in the next section. Nevertheless, these institutions 
remain instrumental in holding local leaders to account. Complaints and response 
mechanisms was therefore measured using:  
 Evidence of use of procedures to register  complaints before the relevant authorities 
 Evidence of use of mechanisms to respond to complaints registered before the 
authorities 
2.7 The independent Variables: awareness, local revenue, internal audit capacity and 
culture. 
The independent variables for the study are: awareness of the citizens about the existing 
mechanisms to hold their leaders accountable; capacity of local governments to locally 
generate revenue which the people have a say over, the human resource capacity at the 
internal audit department, capacity of the local council to exercise checks on the bureaucratic 
staff as well as political history of the local government. All these affect accountability at the 
local level therefore resulting in variation in accountability across local governments. The 
researcher did not come across empirical studies specifically explaining variation in 
accountability in local governments; therefore the above mentioned variables were built from 
the existing literature on accountability studies. 
2.7.1 Awareness 
In general, "awareness" may refer to public or common knowledge or understanding about a 
social, scientific, or political issue, and hence many movements try to foster "awareness" of a 
given subject, that is, "raising awareness". This awareness refers to information from “public 
body” and includes a government ministry, department, statutory corporation, authority or 
commission.  In light of this study, awareness specifically refers to access to information 
from local governments which Local Governments Act, 1997 classifies as corporate bodies. 
In Uganda, Access to Information Act was passed in 2005. The main purpose of this Act was: 
(a) to promote an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable Government; (b) to give 
effect to article 41 of the Constitution by providing the right to access to information held by 
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organs of the State, other than exempt records and information; (c) to protect persons 
disclosing evidence of contravention of the law, maladministration or corruption in 
Government bodies; (d) to promote transparency and accountability in all organs of the State 
by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information; and (e) to empower 
the public to effectively scrutinise and participate in Government decisions that affect them. 
The law grants disclosure and automatic access of certain records where an information 
officer shall, once in every two years, publish a description of—(a) the categories of records 
of the public body that are automatically available without a person having to request access 
under the Act, including the categories available— (i) for inspection under a written law 
other than this Act; (ii) for purchase or copying from the public body; and (iii) from the 
public body free of charge; and (b) how to obtain access to those records. 
Where the information officer receives a request for access to records or information, he or 
she shall ensure that the records or information concerned are properly preserved until the 
request is met and where there is an appeal, until all the procedures for appeal are exhausted. 
The law also mandates information officers to disclose any information in public interest 
unless (a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of— (i) a substantial 
contravention of, or failure to comply with the law; or (ii) an imminent or serious public 
safety, public health or environmental risk; and it is further provided that (b) the public 
interest in the disclosure of the record is greater than the harm contemplated in the provision 
in question. 
Proper local accountability prerequisites both citizens and central government have accurate 
and accessible information about local governments. This includes available resources, 
performance, service levels, budgets, accounts and other financial indicators. Scholars argue 
that, it is only when civil society is equipped with such information that there can be 
informed and meaningful public debate on the allocation of limited resources and public 
acceptance of tradeoffs. Folscher et al. (1999) cited in (Devas and Grant, 2003).  
 
The role of media of spreading political news and public information is crucial but often they 
do not have resources to undertake investigative journalism, which focuses on issues of 
public accountability. Radio can be a key medium at the local level and this is through 
provision of local news, talk shows, question and answer programmes to literate and illiterate, 
rich and poor citizens alike (Devas and Grant, 2003). 
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The media is seen to have a dual role in information disclosure: to publicize political news 
and uncover government malpractices. The first role is based on the premise that people 
holding leaders accountable is only possible if people know what is going on, that is both 
good and bad. Without vigorous media to spreading it, political news remains the property of 
the inside few that is elite capture. The media’s second role is to help uncover government 
misdeeds. This investigative function is subordinate to the main public information function. 
However, there are other institutions and opposition political parties, civil society, and the 
legal system to uncover malfeasance. Moreover, at the local level the latter role becomes 
even more secondary, or perhaps unrealistic, for small newspapers and radio stations 
generally cannot afford to sponsor the work necessary to undertake good investigative 
journalism.  
 
Local media is therefore called upon to perform the distribution of public information 
function that is: to make political news from all sources (including government, opposition 
parties, and civil society organizations) available to the widest possible audience. In 
developing countries this is done through radios. Newspapers tend to be published only in 
larger population centers, and are accessible only to those who can read them (although in 
many societies it is traditional for literate people to read aloud to non literate audiences). 
Television reception is confined to those who can afford a TV set and live within the 
effective radius of a transmitter. But radio, especially the FM band (and in fact it is common 
in Uganda), is cheap to operate, does not require line-of-sight transmission like TV, and has 
great audience potential. Local news, talk shows, and question-and-answer programs are all 
excellent ways to spread political news widely (Blair, 2000) 
 
This study therefore measures awareness using (1) the number of communication channels 
such as radios, news papers, television, and website as indicators of access to information and 
(2) number of civil society organizations/ community based organizations (CBOs). The main 
assumption guiding these measurements is that the different mechanisms of communication 
such as radios, televisions and news papers facilitate passage of information from the local 
government to the citizens. Appropriateness of these channels for the citizens also determine 
their usage. This appropriateness if influenced by other social demographic factors such as 
literacy levels of the community, poverty and age distribution of the population.  
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Besides civil society organizations (CSOs) also known as community based organizations 
(CBOs) play an important role in sensitizing the citizens about their roles in holding leaders 
accountable. They need to demand for the needed information among others. They give the 
citizens an amplified voice in demanding for accountability. Therefore, two assumptions 
were developed from this variable:  
 The more the number of communication channels such as radio, TV, website, and 
newspapers, the more accountable the local government. In other words openness of 
government and good participation depend on the presence of the media to pass this 
information. 
 The more the number of civil society groups in the local government, the higher the 
level of accountability 
2.7.2 Local Government Capacity  
The Local Government Capacity refers to the ability of people to execute tasks.  It 
specifically refers to the ability to mobilize resources, make institutions function as well as 
hold leaders accountable. Capacity of local governments was measured in three ways: the 
proportion of locally generated funds, the, human resource capacity especially in the internal 
audit department and the capacity to establish checks and balances between the political and 
bureaucratic arms of government. 
The proportion of locally generated funds is derived from the legal provision that each local 
government mandated to collect their own revenue under Section 80(1) of the Local 
Governments Act 1997, which states that, “Local governments may levy, charge and collect 
fees and taxes, including rates, rents, royalties, stamp duties, personal graduated tax, and 
registration and licensing fees and the fees and taxes”(Uganda, 1997). Proportion of locally 
generated revenue is measured by the percentage of local government revenue generated 
locally. The main assumption here is that, funds generated locally give impetus for those who 
contribute the tax revenue to hold their leaders to account. Therefore the assumption, 
 The higher proportion of revenue generated locally, the more accountable the local 
government. 
 
Human resource capacity, especially in the internal audit plays two important roles. This is 
measured by the number of employees in the department against the recommended number at 
upper local government. The argument here is that, if a local government has fewer staff, then 
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it cannot offer adequate audit services for the institutions such as schools, health facilities and 
lower local governments under its jurisdiction, therefore these institutions tend to be exposed 
to corruption, yet proper accountability at the lower local governments and other institutions 
account for the overall accountability of the district or municipal local government. This 
measurement was based on the assumption that;  
 The better the capacity of human resource in internal audit of the local government, 
the higher the level of accountability.   
Ability to supervise the technical or bureaucratic staff is also important. It is based on the 
assumption that, where the political arm of the local government has ability to supervise the 
technical or bureaucratic staff accountability is strengthened. The ability to supervise 
bureaucratic staff is influenced by the level of formal education of political leadership. This 
level of education also influences the level of participation in sectoral committees including 
Local Government Public Accounts Committee that is mandated to scrutinize accountability 
at the local government, therefore enforce answerability. Therefore the assumption, 
 The better the ability to supervise bureaucratic staff, the higher the level of 
accountability.   
2.7.3 Political History 
Political history is the narrative and analysis of political events, ideas, movements, and 
leaders. According to Hegel, political history "is an idea of the state with a moral and 
spiritual force beyond the material interests of its subjects: it followed that the state was the 
main agent of historical change (Tosh, 1991). Political history is measured by the history that 
is the culture of the people and leadership style. The main assumption is that, good corruption 
free leadership in local government impacts on  
 The better the more open and transparent the leadership style in local government, 
the higher the level of accountability 
2.8 Control Variables. 
This analysis is intended to cushion the main explanatory variable from other factors that 
might offer rivaling explanations for variation in performance of accountability in the 
selected local governments.   
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Aware of the great discrepancies in availability of fiscal resources between local governments 
in Uganda in that the affluent districts spend more than ten times the per capita of the 
underprivileged districts, controlling for Available Fiscal Resources is important because it 
could have a bearing on the way services are provided and consequently how accountable 
local governments is. This is because people perceive service provision as a form of 
accountability.  However of interest will be the share of local government budget generated 
locally as people could look at central government transfers as ‘other people’s money’ 
therefore less concern themselves with how it is used. 
 
The study will also hold constant legislation (electoral rules, oversight mechanism), as the 
structure of local governments in Uganda is primarily enshrined in the Constitution and 
enforced by the Local Governments Act, 1997.  However, variation in adherence to the law 
could give interesting results across local governments. This aspect could be of interest for 
future research. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to position the study in theoretical and empirical domain. It 
started with reviewing literature, and then focused on the theory that informs the study and 
concluded with a conceptual framework.  
Awareness, capacity and political history are seen to have a bearing on the way local 
government officials and local politicians are answerable, obliged and can face sanctions 
from the population or their superiors for their actions and inactions through transparency, 
participation as well as complaints and response mechanisms that are in place all of which 
constitute accountability of the local government.  
Other factors that vary across local governments include availability of fiscal resources and 
legislation that also affect accountability in local governments. This study will however hold 
these factors constant, except being mindful of the fact that at times legislations may not be 
comprehensive enough.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we discuss the methodology employed during the data collection. The 
objective of the research is to find out and examine the effects of explanatory factors for 
variation of accountability in the selected Local Governments in Uganda. In the chapter, we 
explain the rationale for the choice of the methods of data collection, the problems 
encountered during data collection as well as the limitations of the study.  
3.2 Qualitative Research Methods:  
Qualitative research is a popular method in many different disciplines including social 
sciences. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) point out that the main aim of qualitative research is to 
gather in-depth understanding of phenomena, human behaviour and understanding behind 
such phenomena. This explains the need for smaller but focused samples compared to large 
samples. Qualitative studies are used in instances where one needs to get in-depth knowledge 
about the phenomena from the view point of the participants. 
According to Creswell (2003), qualitative research assumes the natural setting of the 
participants. Given the need to establish the factors responsible for variation in accountability 
in local governments, it was important that the in-depth interviews with political and 
technical leaders of Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District local governments be 
conducted.  
3.2.1 Primary data 
Primary data was obtained through in-depth interviews and observation.  
a) In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews are conversations between two people that is the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Yin (2009) argues that the researcher can ask the informant about the facts of a 
matter as well as their opinions about events. Such informants can become the source of 
reference for further inquiry sometimes. He however cautions that the researcher should 
avoid over depending on the informants. Such mistakes can be avoided by resorting to other 
sources of data for verification. 
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In order to obtain detailed information in an attempt to find explanation for variation in 
accountability in local governments in Uganda, 12 respondents were interviewed (see table 
1). In-depth interviews are acclaimed for being focused on the case being studied and clarity 
in provision of insights into casual inferences (Yin, 2009:102).  
This method however has its own share of both theoretical and practical challenges, which 
the researcher encountered. Scholars have argued that, the major theoretical challenges of 
interviewing are biases due to poorly articulated questions, response biases reflexivity and in 
accuracies due to poor recording among others (Yin, 2009:102). Aware of these challenges, 
we tried to ensure proper articulation of questions and clarification where necessary and we 
also tried not to influence the respondents, thereby avoiding the biases. 
The practical challenges came in as respondents may not be natural but rather act to impress 
the researcher. This is what   Müller refers to ‘arguing,’ that the stage is a place to act; and 
that the actors have to be familiar with the stage, though, a newly and well-chosen place can 
stimulate the discussions. It allows for comparisons and can even surprise the actors, such 
that, in the end, they act in a different way. Different stages will trigger different plays; the 
actors will shape their bodies and their dialogue in different ways.  
On the issue of whether the Local governments have the capacity to enforce accountability 
for instance, the respondents insisted they had the technical competence and were performing 
very well. However further inquiries revealed that, some of the local governments were 
operating far below the required human resource levels especially in the internal audit 
department of Maracha District. 
b) Observation 
Observation is another qualitative research technique. It entails observing phenomena in their 
natural setting. We made use of observation by reporting early to the field. This gave us the 
opportunity not only to see the way local governments function but also to observe them in 
their own setting.  
The challenges with this method lies in the practicality of being time consuming, moreover 
the research involved travel for long distance between the two local governments of Entebbe 
and Maracha, which are on two extreme ends of the country.  
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Tension could also be visibly seen in some of the respondents despite assurances that the 
information was only for academic research purposes. Thus, corroborating Yin’s assertion 
that respondents may behave differently because they are being observed(Yin, 2009:102). 
Figure 5: List of Respondents 
Entebbe Municipal Council Maracha District 
Planned  No Actual  No Planned  No Actual  No 
Town Clerk 1 Town Clerk 1 CAO 1 Assistant CAO 1 
CFO 1     CFO 1 CFO 1 
Economist 1 Economist 1 Economist 1 Economist 1 
PPO 1 Statician 1 PPO 1 PPO 1 
PO 1     P.O 1 PO 1 
Councillors 2     Councillors 2     
Council Speaker 1 Speaker 1 Council Speaker 1     
Mayor 1     Mayor 1 LCV Chairperson 1 
Other 
Respondents 
1 
CLCD 1 Other respondent 1 District Engineer 1 
   10   5   10   7 
CAO  Chief Administrative Officer 
CFO  Chief Finance Officer 
PPO Principal Personnel Officer 
CLCD Commissioner Local Council Development 
PO Personnel Officer 
3.2.2 Secondary data 
For secondary data, after the necessary permission was obtained, we were granted access to a 
number of relevant government documents which included the Constitution of Uganda, the 
Local Governments Act, Statistical Information on socio economic and demographic figures, 
District Development plans as well as Internal Assessment Reports. 
3.3 Comparative Case Study 
In this study, we employed a comparative or “two-Case” Study Research Design. A case 
study is an intensive method through which one can know precisely the factors and causes of 
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a particular phenomenon. P.V. Young cited in Sharma (2008) defines case study as a method 
of exploring and analyzing the life of a social unit, be it a person, a family an institution, 
cultural group or even entire community . According to Yin, although all designs can lead to 
successful case studies, when you have the choice (and resources), multiple-case design may 
be preferred over single-case designs; even if you do a “two-case study” your chances of 
doing a good case study will be better than using a single case study (Yin, 2009).  
Case studies employ various sources of evidence ranging from direct observation, interviews, 
as well as use of documentary evidence. This solves the problems of reliability and 
validity(Yin, 2009).  
 
One major criticism of case studies is that most of the times it uses small sample size and 
from which findings of which are not easy to generalize. Secondly there is the obstacle of 
subjectivity of the researcher, whose opinions cannot easily be delinked from the study. Yin 
however argues that, generalisation can be done to the content of the findings. The study 
findings are seen through the lens of previous studies, that is existing theories (Yin, 2009). 
 
The choice of research design however depends on the phenomenon under investigation. 
Hedrick et al, (1993) argue that, “selection of a design affects the credibility of a research, its 
usefulness and its feasibility” .  
 
Therefore the choice of the case study strategy was based on the feasible time and financial 
resources and above all the research questions under investigation. For a constructive and 
practical comparison, it is imperative to focus on a limited number of cases, in which the 
choice is two extreme cases in terms of location and performance on accountability-according 
to the information from the parent ministry.  
3.4 Methods of Data Collection 
3.4.1 Units of analysis 
The units of analysis for the study constitute Maracha District and Entebbe Municipal Local 
Governments which are upper level local governments in Uganda. The research does not 
cover the lower local governments: the sub-county and division levels. This is mainly 
because the upper level local government forms a link between the grassroots and the central 
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government. It is on this basis that we expect to find respondents who are knowledgeable in 
these upper level local governments.  
The specific units of analysis for the study are Entebbe Municipal Council-a replica local 
government and Maracha District- a struggling local government. Ministry of Local 
Government randomly selected the two Local governments basing on the fact that, Entebbe 
Municipality is part of Wakiso, which has been among the model districts together with Gulu 
and Luweero (Kasasira, 2011). The researcher’s choice of the units of analysis was based on 
further based on the ease of accessibility to Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District 
Local Governments. 
3.4.2 Overview of areas of Study: Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District 
Local Governments 
3.4.2.1 Entebbe Municipal Council 
Entebbe municipality derives its name from the Luganda word “entebe” (meaning  “seat” or 
“chair”) referring to the rocky seats on the shores of Lake Victoria which were carved by 
Mugula, a Muganda traditional Chief in the early 18th century. Being a close confidant of the 
Kabaka (king of Buganda), Mugula wielded substantial administrative and judicial powers. 
He latter carved out for himself seats in the rock from where he used to administer justice. 
People visiting this place used to say that they were going to “Entebbe za Mugula” (Mugula’s 
seats). Later it became fashionable to refer to the place simply as Entebbe. 
 
Entebbe lies at 0
o
.04N, 320.28
o
 E and is 37 kilometers South East of Kampala the capital city 
of Uganda.  It is situated in Wakiso District boarding Lake Victoria in the South.  The 
Municipality is located on a peninsular into Lake Victoria covering a total area of 56.2 km
2
, 
out of which 20km
2
 is water. 
 
The most crucial aspect of Entebbe’s location in Uganda is that it has the only international 
airport in Uganda and as such it is a critical post of entry into Uganda internationally both for 
trade and other aspects of international relations. 
 
The final results of the 2002 population census put Entebbe Municipality population at a total 
of 55.086 of whom 27.135 are males and 27.951 females.  The mean household size is 3.8, 
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whereas the sex ratio is 97.0.  The 2002 census also revealed that the Municipality has 14,216 
households 
 
There are a number of livelihood groups that contribute to the social economic development 
of Entebbe Municipality and these include; civil servants, contractors, casual laborers, 
pensioners, artisan, brick makers, vehicle repairers, fisher folk, farmers, traders, hoteliers and 
aviation related occupations.  Entebbe Municipality is one of the areas with low poverty 
levels in Uganda.  According to the 1999 poverty mapping and the 2005 report released by 
the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) the levels are low and decreasing. 
 
 Entebbe became the capital city of Uganda in 1894 following a decision in 1893 by the 
colonial Governor Sir Gerald Portal to relocate from Kampala to Entebbe. This decision was 
later rescinded by the independence Government and the capital reverted to Kampala leaving 
Entebbe with the International Airport and a few Ministry Headquarters and government 
departments. 
 
Entebbe municipality is organized administratively in accordance with the Constitution of 
Uganda 1995, and the Local Government Act 1997. The municipality is divided into a 
number of administrative units namely; the Municipal level, administered under the 
Municipal Council, two Municipal Divisions (Division A and Division B) under the 
Municipal Division councils, each Municipal Division has two wards (parishes), Kigungu 
ward, Kiwafu ward, Central ward and Katabi ward and there are a total of 24 sub-wards in 
the Municipality.         
 
The Municipality is headed by His Worship the Mayor and has 19 Councilors 7 of whom 
constitute the Executive Committee. The role of the Municipal Executive Committee is to 
initiate and formulate policies for approval by the Council. It also oversees the 
implementation of policies made by the Council and by the central Government. For 
effectiveness, the Council operates through its 2 standing committees namely: Finance, 
Planning and Education: This is responsible for Treasury, Audit, Management, Planning, 
Education & Sports and the Works, Production and Public Health: This is responsible for 
Engineering, Water, Roads Physical Development, Production, Health and Environment. Each 
Committee is responsible for monitoring reviewing and reporting to Council the performance 
of their respective sectors.   
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The technical arm of the Municipality is headed by the Town Clerk, under whom, there are 
several Municipal Departments  
3.4.2.2 Maracha District Local Government 
Maracha District was created in 2009/10 financial year and started operations in from 1
st
 July 
2010/11 financial year. Maracha District is found in the North Western region lying between 
Arua and Koboko Districts. Its district headquarters and commercial town is in Maracha 
Town Council. Maracha District is bordered by Koboko District in the North, Yumbe District 
in the North East, Democratic Republic of Congo in the West and by Arua District in the 
South.  
The District has an approximate total area of 441Square Kilometres according to service map 
produced by CUAM in 2006. About 2.09% (0.92 sq.km) of the total land is occupied by 
forests, water bodies and hills. Leaving a total of 440.08 square kilometres as the available 
habitable and arable land. 0.02 sq. Km of the total land is occupied by water bodies and 
wetlands. 
Maracha District is made up of one county (Maracha County), Seven Sub-Counties and one 
town council (Maracha Town Council) with 44 parishes/wards. Yivu Sub County has the 
largest number of parishes (eight parishes) in the district and Nyadri has the least number of 
parishes (i.e. three parishes).  The size and number of the villages and parishes have greatly 
affected the extent to which services are provided to the population in that some villages are 
too large and difficult to reach with ease in the process of service delivery 
The district population grew at an average annual rate of 3.3% between 2008 and 2010. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the population grew by 1.4% and between 2009 and 2010 the 
population grew by 5.2%. This population growth rate is much higher than the national 
growth rate of 3.2% observed during 1991 to 2002. The high growth rate is largely due to 
high fertility levels averaging 7 children per woman, observed over the last four decades.  
Politically, the district council is the highest political authority and has the legislative and 
executive powers. The current district council consists of a total 19 district councillors 
including the five (05) members of the district executive. The district council meets once 
after every two months with the two (02) extra ordinary council sittings legally allowed.  
However the total number of councillors is expected to be over 19 if all members to the 
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district council are elected and in place especially with representations from all the special 
interest groups. The district chairperson is the political head of the district.  
below the council is the district executive committee which comprises of the district 
chairperson as the executive head, vice chairperson and secretaries responsible for education, 
health and social services and environment, works and technical services, security, 
production and marketing and finance and planning. The executive committee at the district 
level is the replica of the cabinet at the national level and is responsible for policy 
formulation and monitoring the implementation of lawful decisions of the council.  
The council conducts business through standing committees. There are committees 
responsible for education, health and social services and environment, works and technical 
services, production and marketing and finance and planning. 
 
The District Public Accounts Committee, the District Contracts Committee, the District Land 
Board, and the District Service Commission are statutory bodies. There boards and 
commissions established to carry out functions that fall outside of the normal council 
business. These are provided for to foster transparency and accountability in the delivery of 
services to the people. Boards and commissions perform very important functions in the 
service of the district, many of which have legal implications and if not properly discharged 
can cause serious problems and loss to the district council. It is important that the members 
serving in those organs are well versed with their roles. Given that members of these organs 
change from time to time, it is important that they are provided with opportunities to improve 
their performances through training and exchange of ideas with their counterparts in other 
local governments and central government. 
The Civil Service arm of the District consists of the appointed staff headed by the Chief 
Administrative Officer. The CAO assisted by his deputy and Assistants head the civil service 
wing of the district. The sub-county chiefs and parish chiefs are responsible for sub-county 
and parish administrations respectively.  
Within the CAOs office there are departments responsible for personnel, office 
administration, record management and information and public relations.  
The CAO is responsible for inter alia  the: implementation of all lawful decisions of the 
district council; guiding the district council and its departments on the implementation of the 
relevant laws; supervision, monitoring and co-ordination of the activities of the district and 
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lower council’s employees and departments and ensuring accountability and transparency in 
service delivery and management; supervision and co-ordination of the activities of delegated 
services and the officers working in those services; act as liaison between the district and 
central government; advise the chairperson on the administration of the council; and assist in 
the maintenance discipline in the district. The CAO is also responsible for staff appraisal and 
fully entitled to carry out spot checks and management audits in any department. 
The heads of departments report and are directly answerable to the CAO while coordinating 
all the staff and activities in their respective departments. The heads of departments are 
secretaries to their respective sectoral committees. 
The CAO is answerable and subject to the general direction of the district chairperson, who is 
in turn answerable to the district council. 
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Figure6: Location of Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District Local Governments 
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58 
 
3.4.3 Sampling  
Sampling is very important in qualitative research because not the whole study population 
can be studied due to limited time and resources. A study population is the subset of the 
population with the condition or characteristics of interest defined by the eligibility criteria 
(Friedman et al., 2010:55). It is therefore important to pick out a portion of the population 
(the sample) that is representative of the entire population.  
a) Sample Size 
Although the planned sample size was atleast 20 respondents, (10 in each local government). 
The only 12 of respondents were interviewed. These were: 1. The Commissioner Local 
Council Development in the Ministry of Local Government; 2). Town Clerk Entebbe, 3) 
Speaker Entebbe Municipal Council; 4) Town Planner/Economist Entebbe Municipal 
Council, 5) Statician Entebbe Municipal Council; 6) District Engineer Maracha District,       
7) Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Maracha District,  8) District Planner Maracha; 
9)Procurement Officer Maracha 10)District Personnel Officer Maracha 11) Local Council V 
Chairperson Maracha 12) Chief Finance Officer Maracha District.  
b) Sampling Criteria 
The sampling criteria used were mainly purposive because of the nature of the research 
question. The study involved was looking for people who are knowledgeable about the topic. 
However, individuals came to be included in the sample by virtue of the office they occupied. 
Some of the respondents were delegated the responsibility by their immediate supervisors to 
attend the interview with the researcher. This had the advantage of getting information from 
resourceful persons. However, it could also compromise the quality of information that was 
collected, thus posing reliability challenges.  
To get a balanced view, the sample was included both the bureaucratic and the political arms 
of the local governments 
3.5 Research instruments 
Data is often described in one of two broad categories namely: primary and secondary data. 
Among the primary sources are people, independent and descriptive observation of events, 
activities and so forth; physical documents and test results. Secondary sources included 
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administrative records, economic and social indicators, prior research studies, published 
archival data sets (Hedrick et al., 1993). 
3.6 Problems encountered during data collection 
 
Though the study was scheduled to take two months, delay in getting clearance from the 
Uganda National Council for Science and Technology-(UNCST)-(The National Research 
Council), where clearance was given after a period of one and a half months and another two 
weeks from the Ministry of Local Governments posed real challenges to data collection 
schedules.  
 
Obtaining clearance from the UNCST is mandatory for any research whose results are to be 
used for academic or any other purposes outside the country (Uganda). It is also mandatory to 
obtain the clearance from the Office of the President of Uganda to conduct such research 
which involves obtaining information from Public Officials as well as accessing government 
documents. The challenge here is that the researcher did not have prior knowledge of this 
particular procedure in the research policy of the country. 
 
Such delays affected the research process, thus the use of only qualitative methods as 
opposed to the initial planned mixed methods. The advantage with mixed methods is that it 
would have enabled the researcher to benefit from the advantages while compensating for the 
potential limitations of each method (Eckardt, 2008:36) 
 
The second challenge relates to getting the respondents for the study. The point of focus was 
to interview individuals holding particular positions, either the technical or political arms of 
government. Some potential respondents could not give time for interview as they had busy 
schedules while some cancelled appointment at the last minute, therefore making me spend a 
lot of time and money in an attempt to get information.  As a result, in some cases, 
respondents had to be substituted with delegated authority some of whom were very 
knowledgeable and gave me the necessary information they could. 
 
The third methodological challenge relates to measurement of variables in question. The 
concepts of decentralisation, accountability and performance are rather elusive. Therefore 
measurement of these variables pose a major challenge to the study. However, these variables 
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have a lot of concrete values considering studies of local governance; therefore we had a 
trade-off between the measurability and significance. 
 
The fourth challenge was practical, being a comparative study between two local 
governments which were far apart, coupled with limited time remaining it became difficult to 
manage appointments with respondents between the two local governments. However, we 
tried our level best to get as many respondents and sometimes get substitutes or deputies, 
where it was possible. This nevertheless worked and the much needed data was obtained. 
3.7 Quality of the Data: Validity and Reliability of Data 
If data is not accurate and reliable, it is of little significance (Hedrick et al., 1993). Therefore 
the quality of data needs to be checked for consistency and conformity to logical tests (Yin, 
2009:40). Yin recommends case design tactics for the four design tests: 
Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring.  (King et al., 1994). It is 
divided into three: construct validity, internal validity and external validity. 
Construct validity is to identifying corrrect operational measures for concepts being studied. 
Yin suggests to be sure that the correct measures are being used, we need to use multiple 
sources of data. This study thereore used employed both in-depth interview, observation as 
well as document review, which have been elaborated on. Construct  tried to define and 
operationalize the variables. 
Internal validity seeks to establish causal relationship between variables, whereby one 
condition is believed to lead to another. This can be done through explanation building and 
elimination of rival explanations. The relationship between independent variable,  
Institutional Environmental Fctors and Dependent Variable, variation in accountability was 
established. 
External validity defines the domain to which the findings of a study can be generalised. This 
can be done through use of theory in single case studies and replication in multiple case 
studies. To this end, the researcher used two two-case studies, though they had contrasting 
experience therefore replicating the same instruments across the sample was useful in getting 
insights. 
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Reliability on the other hand refers to whether the operations of a study can be replicated by 
another researcher and the same results are obtained. This at times proves a challenge in 
qualitative studies but Yin recommends developing respondents database.  
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
The study followed the necessary procedures as the researcher obtained a letter of 
introduction from the University of Bergen, the necessary clearance from the National 
Council for Science and technology and the Office of the President to Conduct the Research; 
given that it involved first: interviewing public officers and secondly access to government 
documents. This though proved a challenge at some stage. However, being aware of these 
requirements for future researchers would involve early contact with the relevant institutions 
much as the researcher raised his frustration of the system to the concerned authorities. 
I also sought permission of each respondent to participate in the interviews assuring them of 
confidentiality of the information and purpose of the study. I further sought to record their 
voices on tape recorder, of which they were not comfortable with, therefore I had to respect 
their views and resort to taking notes as the interview went along. This enabled them to 
express themselves freely. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology used to collect data. It highlighted the main research 
design used in the study was comparative case study of Entebbe Municipal Council and 
Maracha District Local Governments. The researcher interviewed 12 participants, both local 
politicians and bureaucrats.  The main methodological challenge was that some of the would-
be leaders respondents did not actually participate in the interview, coupled with. This could 
have been a threat to the reliability of the data, though the researcher had to try and get other 
relevant sources such as reports and archival records and observation to supplement the 
findings. There was also a challenge with measuring some of the study variables as the 
concepts under analysis were quite elusive, therefore the researcher had to focus on the 
relevance of the variables rather than measurement in some of the cases, nevertheless the 
findings were satisfactory as we shall see in the following chapters.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 ACCOUNTABILITY METHODS, MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES IN 
UGANDA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This study is both exploratory and explanatory, and this chapter provides qualitative 
empirical evidence on accountability in the selected local governments. Here the findings of 
the study namely; the indicators of accountability in both Entebbe Municipal Council and 
Maracha District Local Governments are concurrently presented. The aim of this is to bring 
out clearly the similarities and contrasts between the selected units of analysis. The main 
study findings are based on testimonial evidence from respondents and documents that the 
local governments provided. These sources are supplemented with observations made during 
the field study.  
 
The chapter starts with a more general presentation of how respondents understand the 
concept of accountability and whose interests in their view local governments serve and then 
examines local government transparency, citizens’ participation and local governments’ 
complaints and response mechanisms that are in place. 
 
The question we need to ask ourselves is: How do the local political leaders and bureaucrats 
understand accountability? In whose interests are do the local leaders work? What 
mechanisms and processes are used by the executive, legislature and the citizens in 
governance? Rosen(1998) looks at these overarching accountability questions in the US in his 
analysis of Public Bureaucracy. This part of the study borrows some elements from his 
analysis to understand accountability relations in Entebbe Municipality and Maracha District. 
The study is also based on arguments from Eckardt’s (2008) study in Indonesia, which will 
give it a grounding in a developing country context. 
4.1.1 Understanding accountability Local Governments 
Our main aim is to find out why there exists variation in accountability across local 
governments in Uganda; the study also was intended to unearth some of the factors hinder or 
constrain accountability in the selected local governments in Uganda. Aware of the 
limitations and inadequacies of a single source to obtain data, the study employed multiple 
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sources to obtain information on accountability in the selected local governments. to find out 
why there is variation, we first need to establish whether there is vitiation. Therefore we first 
understand the perception of accountability and then the indicators of accountability. 
4.1.2 Conceptualising accountability 
When asked what they understand by accountability, respondents in Entebbe Municipal 
council observed that accountability means the following:  
....To me accountability means being answerable for one’s actions or inactions. 
... Being accountable is being answerable to a higher authority. 
It simply means that I am able to explain what I have done, why I have done it and 
how I have done it. In other words, it’s being answerable to the higher authority. For 
instance one should be able to provide the supporting documents for expenses made. 
On the other hand, respondents in Maracha District argue that, 
The two concepts discretion and accountability mean two different things. Discretion 
means decide what you want. When we talk of accountability, it can mean different 
things. There is technical accountability, which concerns itself with project 
implementation and political accountability, which is promises fulfilled. For these two 
resources must be available 
The responses on what respondents perceive as accountability strengthen the assertion that, 
accountability takes into account the obligation by the accounter to answer to the accountee. 
The different connotations also come out clearly in these responses. While some focus on the 
documentation as accountability, others look at the fulfilment of the promises made that is 
political accountability. The other element being emphasised is the traditional bureaucratic 
approach to answerability. All these dynamics point to the question: whose interests are 
valued in accountability issues? And this remains a point of controversy across local 
governments. Accountability as before has remained an elusive concept but with connotations 
of answerability, responsibility and responsiveness as points of focus. Local politicians and 
bureaucrats view accountability as answerability. 
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4.1.3 Whose interests do local governments serve? 
Theoretically, decentralized governments serve the interests of the local people-the citizens. 
Scholars have, however, argued that the rent-seeking behaviour of local leaders tend to 
impede performance and therefore accountability at the local level. It is hard to establish the 
true impacts of corruption of local leaders on accountability and service provision relations 
because many times, those involved try to keep such interactions discrete from both the 
public and peripheral observers.  
In Entebbe Municipal Council, respondents stated that attention is paid expectations of the 
higher authority namely, the central government: One of the respondents attested to this: 
They want to see good reports...but sometimes people postpone to the last minute, so 
this affects the quality of the reports.... 
On planning, sometimes we consult the people about their priorities and their wards 
and so plans are discussed. LCs and counsellors present priorities and depending on 
how much we have we add or subtract....the guidelines are given by the Ministry of 
Local Government. 
On the question of in whose interest local governments work, one respondent from Maracha 
District pointed to the fact that, there are many competing interests on the ground. To him, 
There are political agitators, co-agitators etc in the public. Satisfaction is not 
universal. By nature people hate the past, praise the current and glorify the future. 
Therefore they are very unpredictable. 
In short, these responses point to a number of conclusions: first, in accountability relations, 
one party is answerable to another.  Secondly, that there are competing interests and thus 
depending on accountability depends on who is able to enforce sanctions. Those with powers 
to enforce sanctions tend to have more loyalty to their authority, not necessarily because they 
are obliged but because there is fear of sanctions. Thirdly, individuals have their personal 
interests that must come at the forefront. A technical person implements a project because it 
has implications for his or her personal benefits. Similarly a politician fulfils promises for 
their personal gains. 
Due to the central authority to which all local governments are subject, there is some level of 
consensus on the fact that, accountability is seen as implementation of projects. Respondents 
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from the two selected local governments for instance give improvement in the road 
construction sector as an evidence of accountability in local governance. Entebbe Municipal 
council boasts of 150 kilometers of roads, while Maracha District has 200 kilometers of road 
network. 
Evidence from interviews however showed a significant difference in the way different local 
governments conducted their affairs. Commentary and testimonial evidence from EMC 
reveals that budgets are done at Ward level (lower local governments), but the priorities are 
set from the centre: 
..our role is to propose projects to the council. Sometimes, wards make their own 
plans but we change these plans to suit the central government priorities... 
This is clear evidence that most of the times; plans are made in total disregard of the interests 
of the local people. 
In Maracha, there is evidence of an ongoing construction of a storied Council Complex. This 
is probably one of the first storied buildings in the district, a good initiative but the question is 
whether it is in the interest of the citizen. The current structures housing district headquarters 
were formerly the sub-county headquarters for Nyadri Sub County (a lower local 
government). The district council took a unilateral decision to build an alternative a sub 
county headquarters for Nyadri Sub-county on a piece of land which belonged to one of the 
residents, without compensation. The District Council went ahead to disregard court orders 
stopping them from unlawfully occupying the land (at no cost) thereby attracting a whooping 
35,000 US dollar fine against the district, which has to be paid to the resident. No public 
communication is made on who is responsible for this debt. 
Talking of rent-seeking behaviour, bureaucrats from Entebbe Municipal Council, which is 
acclaimed as an example of accountable local government by the Local Government 
Ministry, failed to account for some of their funds. Local newspapers reported that the Town 
Clerk was chased away by the Parliaments Public Accounts Committee, following failure by 
officials from the Municipality to present credible accountability documents. They sometimes 
disowned their own accountability documents worth Uganda Shillings 92 million 
(Approximately US Dollars 35,000.00) which were purportedly given out to staff as loans 
without any proper approval or even document. Such are clear cases of diversionary budget 
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outlays on which the local people have no control, yet the elite claim the local people are 
involved in the budgeting and accountability process. 
Another surrogate example of rent seeking behaviour of the local leaders is awarding 
themselves salaries and allowances. This goes on to affect their attendance of council 
sessions. In Maracha District for example, interview results show that, Council attendance of 
workshops or even Council meetings is based on whether there is ‘lunch’ allowance.  
....If they suspect that there will no such benefits then they do not simply turn up. 
While both Maracha District and EMC tend to reflect elite mismanagement of resources, 
there is a clear evidence of variation in the kind of accountability presented.  Whereas EMC 
performed well, according to Local Government rankings, the local population at Maracha 
seems to be satisfied with the new district as they can now receive services close at hand. The 
district boasts of having renovated health workers’ staff houses in all sub counties, opening 
up new roads, as well as constructing new bridges, which have been a dream for many years.   
It is therefore clear that, there are both similarities and differences in Entebbe Municipal 
Council and Maracha District Local Governments. The point of convergence is rent seeking 
behaviour also referred to as elite capture which features in both local governments but the 
difference is in the way the individual interests are pursued. Such variations leave us with 
another question. How did such diverse government conduct emerge in both local 
governments? This question therefore calls for further investigation of what could have 
caused such variation. This aspect will be covered in the next chapter. We shall first pay 
attention to: transparency, participation and complaints and response mechanisms which are 
the indicators of accountability-the dependent variable for this study.  
4.2 Transparency: government openness and citizen access to information 
Transparency in managing public revenue and expenditure as well as other government 
programs is paramount in determining whether such a government is accountable to its 
people or not. Theoretically, transparency is synonymous with free flow of information from 
one party to another. Therefore this study operationalizes transparency as citizens’ access to 
revenue and expenditure information, citizens’ access to internal and external reports and 
reviews and citizens’ access to work plans, approved projects and tenders. Qualitative 
evidence from the two local governments reveals both similarities and variation on in how 
information reaches citizens and the level of transparency.  
67 
 
4.2.1  Availability and Citizens’ access information: 
In Entebbe Municipal Council, local government revenue and expenditure information is 
found to be accessible to citizens through the statistical abstract. This is an annual fact 
booklet published by the municipality. It gives detailed information about each department in 
the municipality and citizens are free to obtain copies. The researcher was availed a soft copy 
of the Statistical Abstract, which is a very useful source of information for this study. 
However, this study did not finding out whether citizens actually take the initiative to get 
copies given the time and resource constraints.  
The municipality also uses notice boards to publicize summary revenue and expenditure 
report for the preceding year. The researcher was able to observe the summary budget and 
expenditure report for the financial year 2010/2011 displayed on the notice board.   
In Maracha district Local government, there is little evidence of revenue and expenditure 
information being made. At best the researcher was able to access the Internal Assessment 
report, which does not spell out how revenue and expenditure are made in the district. Other 
kinds of information are not made public. 
4.3 Participation 
At the confluence of the debate on why local governments are accountable or less 
accountable is participation which is an element of accountability. There is a strong 
theoretical argument that local governments are responsive to the local needs, therefore are 
more accountable to the people who express these needs.  
Participation provides an avenue for responsiveness, which can be seen as fulfilled 
expectations. In the light of this study, responsiveness was seen in terms of fulfilled promises 
and expectations. What remains a question of debate is whether local governments are 
responsive to the local needs or they are responsive, therefore accountable to the Central 
government.  
4.3.1 Participation in local elections and leadership change 
Democratic participation through electoral processes signifies local accountability. Scholars 
argue that, when political leaders do not deliver to the expectations of the citizens, they are 
relieved of their duties in the subsequent elections. The same school of thought argues that, 
local governments facilitate accountability within the local bureaucratic structures. This is the 
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reason for the creation of District Public Accounts Committees, Sectoral Committees as well 
as District Service commissions. 
Accordingly the researcher found out that, there are both comparisons and inconsistencies in 
relation to electoral motivations across the two selected local governments. On account of 
similarity, elections in both local governments are governed by the same electoral laws. 
Elections are also managed by the same Electoral Commission but in Uganda, electoral 
processes are marred by inefficiencies. Electoral accountability is still a farfetched reality due 
to the ignorance of the critical mass. This was the expression by respondents from both local 
governments. 
The hypothetical assumption is that, elections are one of the major avenues through which 
people can express themselves. If local leaders do not perform to the expectation of the 
people, they face the “axe” in the following election.  In Uganda, the Electoral Commission 
as an institution conducts elections and sensitization. The rules for elections are the same for 
all local governments.  
Local elections, like national elections are conducted under multiparty dispensation. 
Opposition in Uganda is still weak as they had been suppressed for many years when the 
country was ruled under one party rule or rather “no party rule” as it was referred to by the 
architects of the ‘Movement System of government’. The focus of political election then was 
the individual. Even as the country returned to multi party politics, citizens still view 
personalities within the political parties rather than ideologies being presented by the political 
party to win an election. Allegiance to the ruling regime is viewed as a way of ‘benefiting’ 
from government. This thought however varies from one place to another. 
Entebbe Municipal Council for a long time has been a stronghold of the ruling NRM party. 
However in the previous elections of (2011) the balance of power shifted. After 18 years of 
rule by an NRM (ruling party) mayor, a Democratic Party (opposition party) Mayor was 
elected with more than two thirds of the Councillors belonging to the same party (Democratic 
Party) winning in the election. This could be viewed as a measure by the electorate to express 
their dissatisfaction with the previous mayor reign calling for accountability.  
The situation is different in Maracha District where all the District Councilors belong to the 
ruling (NRM) National Resistance Movement party. Just like the case in Entebbe, it is in the 
most recent election that, this trend changed. Initially, political posts in the district were 
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predominantly won by Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party, just like the rest of the 
West Nile Region (North Western region) where FDC enjoyed majority support over the 
years.  
What is observed here, however, is that unlike in Entebbe where there was a shift by the 
voters’ choice from one political party to another, in Maracha; it was the politicians who 
changed allegiance from the opposition FDC party to NRM.  Here we see that individuals 
retained their political positions. Patronage seems to play a big role as electoral motivations 
seem to play a smaller role in accountability. 
According to some of the respondents in Maracha District, accountability is hampered by 
individual differences. Asked on whether political party affiliation played a role in lack of 
accountability, this is what one of the respondents had to say: 
All these councilors are Movement, so the issues between them are really personal 
bickering rather than party differences.   
According to the respondents, such personal bickering, hinder legislative oversight over the 
executive and the bureaucracy. This is perhaps the reason the technical staff do not take them 
seriously. One respondent for instance described the state of affairs as:  
Sometimes they do not make a distinction between technical and political decisions. 
They want to solve technical problems politically,  
This seems to hint on the example of district acquisition of land. Another respondent accused 
the politicians of acting irresponsibly by not appreciating the work of the technical team 
4.3.2 Attendance of Local Council meetings by citizens and their leaders 
Local council Meetings also referred to as village meetings provide the platform for citizens 
not only to get feedback from their leaders but also question them, and impose sanctions on 
them for non performance. 
Data gathered shows impressive results in both Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha 
District.  Leaders appreciate the impeccable role of community participation in enhancing 
accountability. With regard to the Entebbe Municipal Council, there is testimonial evidence 
of participation through initiatives such as school committees, village security meetings as 
well as local community programs among others; though some of these are not 
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institutionalised but they provide avenues for the local people to directly participate in the 
management of their affairs. 
We go to the wards and hold meetings with them; they also have the security meeting in 
each village. 
In Maracha respondents who were interviewed accused the citizens of not being interested in 
participating. This is one clear difference in participation between the two local governments. 
4.3.3 Democratic participation, civil society and accountability 
Participation within civil society and community based organisations set up is very important 
for accountability. These organisations play a role on three fronts: they educate their 
members on their rights and responsibilities, act as training ground and are often advocacy 
groups that ask for accountability on behalf of the members.  Because they are in small 
organised groups, it becomes easy to voice one’s concerns through the group, whose 
membership one subscribes to. 
The introduction of decentralization policy in Uganda, like elsewhere was envisioned to 
provide an avenue for the local people to participate in the management of their own affairs. 
Moreover this was to ensure local accountability. As relationship within government 
institutions are clear, a sloppy picture remains of the role of the critical civil society. As 
respondents from selected local governments appreciate the importance of civil society in 
enhancing accountability, there is no legal knot between local government and the activities 
of the civil society apart from the obligation of the local governments to register all the civil 
society groups under their jurisdiction. 
Notable outcomes are also obtained with consideration of the role of civil society in aiding 
deliberate efforts aimed at local participation, which in turn enhances local accountability.  
Here, the role of Non Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations as well 
as Private Organizations is seen as crucial in aiding local accountability. The results of the 
cases vary from one local government to another. 
In Entebbe Municipal Council local government, a report of 2010 indicates: 
After the government appreciating the role of the private sector promoting 
development, it came up with the public private partnership policy which promotes 
joint implementation of programs aimed at reducing poverty levels in the country. 
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Entebbe municipality has got development partners in areas of health, education, 
agriculture, water and sanitation and they are doing a good job in complementing 
service delivery. 
Figure 7: Number of organizations supporting community development initiatives by 
intervention 
 
 
This municipality not only highlights the importance of private sector in ensuring 
participation, service delivery and therefore accountability but also promotes development of 
CSOs and CBOs which are viewed as the engines for local accountability.  
In contrast, despite the appreciation on the side of leadership of the role played by CSOs and 
CBOs, only a few of these organizations including one called Rural Initiative for Community 
Empowerment (RICE) have successfully come on board. Other NGOs operating in the 
district have no offices within the district; they travel from neighboring districts making it 
difficult to incorporate their plans into those of the district. This according to some of the 
respondents in Maracha makes it difficult for the district to know what they are actually 
doing. 
Most of the NGOs in the district operate in secrecy. There is no information on what 
they do and even their funding information is kept secret. This many times results in 
duplication of services. In addition, they have their own priorities which do not take 
into consideration local needs. 
With little presence of CBOs and CSOs, it becomes difficult for such organizations to engage 
the local people to hold their leaders accountable for programs. Many a time people find 
themselves playing the role of pseudo partners than actual participants. The issue of 
participation poses a big challenge in the district, according to the interview results.  
Participation is not so good in the district. People come only when they know there is 
something in the interest of the stomach. However, if there is a problem, say outbreak 
of cholera, people come in big numbers. It is mainly the youth (in small numbers) 
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who come for some of the programs such as HIV/AIDS programs. Women are left at 
home. 
Focusing on participatory accountability mechanisms within governments, local government 
departments in both units of analysis seem to provide ‘equal’ opportunities to their local 
constituents. However, the actual functioning of these institutional mechanisms varies 
significantly. 
In Entebbe Municipal Council, there are several groups of which 98% of them were female 
groups. The municipality has been supporting community development projects geared 
toward empowering all vulnerable groups economically and so far many community projects 
have been established. Such community development initiatives provide opportunity for the 
local people to freely participate in accountability. Evidence from the field indicates that, 
Entebbe has many such organizations. Therefore providing opportunities for the local people 
to participate, and consequently provide them with avenues to seek accountability from their 
leaders. 
 Figure 8: No. of community development groups by Division and Ward 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of women groups by Division 
 
In Maracha District, there are 8 NGOs operating but these are all based in Arua, a 
neighbouring district. None of them has offices in the district. The district has also 8 CBOs 
listed in the DDP. Of these not much emphasis is put on accountability issues by the 
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members. It is therefore hard for a group whose members feel powerless to foster 
accountability among their leaders.  
The following underlying gender issues identified during the situational analysis process 
include but are not limited to: 
Community Based Services: 
Low participation of women in decision- making process particularly in 
planning/budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation- community meetings, 
 High rate of domestic violence against women still on increase 
 Very Low participation of men (29%) in FAL programme as compared to the 
percentage of women 
 Limited property ownership by women 
One however needs to take a careful look at what role these civil society and community 
based organisations play in the process of accountability. The unease of some district officials 
could be of the fact that, they are being asked to account to the masses. 
4.4 Complaints and Response mechanism 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the components of accountability has been examined. 
Democratic participation was given prominence in an attempt to explain the accountability 
mechanisms that exist in Uganda’s local governments.  
The two cases were looked at concurrently, to give the areas a comparative outlook. There 
was found to be significant difference in the way officials from the two local governments 
perceive accountability. Each emphasizes one or the other aspect.  
The last part of the discussion focused informal social-cultural accountability systems that are 
being practiced in the selected local governments. Our voyage now in the next chapter is to 
examine the factors behind this great variation in accountability in Entebbe Municipal 
Council yet the two local governments are in the same country, run under the same laws and 
have their elections conducted by the same electoral commission. The next chapter is 
explanatory in nature. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: EXPLANATION FOR VARIATION 
IN ACCOUNTABILITY  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a presentation of findings of the study on factors that influence is 
accountability in the selected local governments. Here the practical experiences of the 
Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District Local Governments are examined. An 
explanatory approach was adopted to present the data that was mainly collected using 
interviews, local government documents that were availed to the researcher.  In this chapter, 
we examine the role of citizen awareness, local government capacity and political history. 
5.2 Citizens/Public Awareness 
Information plays a very significant role in ensuring accountability in local governments. As 
the saying goes, information is power. Whereas accountability might be intricate to delineate, 
there is a harmony that it involves a rendering of an account and therefore the provision of 
accurate, relevant and timely information to the appropriate stakeholders (Cameron, 2004). 
“Whilst information cannot be equated with accountability it is, according to (Funnell, 2003), 
an essential ingredient of it. Scholars argue that though public sector reforms have resulted in 
public sector organizations providing a wide range of information it has not lead to better 
accountability. Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) similarly argue that the provision of more 
detailed information does not automatically lead to greater accountability. Barton (2006) 
likewise argues that accountability requires openness, transparency and the provision of 
information” (Tippett and Kluvers, 2010). Notwithstanding the different viewpoints, this 
study considers information one of the central ingredients of accountability.  
Citizen/public awareness is operationalized as access to active communication mechanisms 
and number of civil society groups and community based organizations. 
5.2.1 Variety of communication mechanisms 
Findings revealed both similarities and differences in the variety of communication 
mechanisms. These similarities included the channels through which information reaches the 
75 
 
community. However, no attempt was made to examine the impacts of each of the methods 
on the communities. 
In Entebbe Municipal Council, information media used by the Municipality include notice 
boards, office messengers, and community meetings among others. Print media and television 
as well as radios also serve as important communication channels. The advantage with the 
Municipality is that it has a big proportion of literate population. This makes it easy and 
effective to pass written information. Additionally, Entebbe Municipality maintains a 
website, (http://entebbemc.com). This website provides a lot of useful information although 
most of it tends to be of general nature. Specific issues of accountability are not shared on the 
website. A different study needs to be done to ascertain how many residents of the 
municipality are actually aware of the existing communication channels and use them. 
Nevertheless, attempts to put in place means to communicate with the electorate cannot be 
downplayed. 
In Maracha, the situation is not too unlike but there are variations. The district relies on radio 
talk shows and announcements, village meetings and at times advertises tenders in News 
papers. But as presented before, the researcher found out that the district was not even able to 
attract tenders for contracts from competent firms, forcing it to devise means for instance by 
providing tools for road constructions in some cases. 
What is striking is the fact that, both bureaucrats and politicians in Maracha acknowledged 
the inappropriateness of communication channels that are available to the local people. They 
for instance use radios yet the district does not even have a single local radio station apart 
from those in the neighboring districts of Arua and Koboko. Secondly, not all the residents of 
the district have radio receivers. In fact with the high poverty levels, radio receivers are seen 
as luxury to many. Thirdly, the citizens who are on the receiving end of information do not 
contribute to radio talk shows or ask any questions because few of them have mobile phones 
to call in talk shows or even the phones do not have calling credit for calling in. The 
information channels are either few or ineffective in Maracha. 
Therefore, lack of access to information media can stifle effective use of these means of 
communication. Perhaps the most effective way to check accountability would be the village 
meetings. The challenge with this however is again what the respondents expressed:  
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Participation is not so good. …people come expecting something in the interest of the 
stomach. If they don’t see the possibility, they will not come. It’s mainly women who 
are interested but are preoccupied with house cores, so therefore do not usually attend. 
Though there are similarities. It still remains that Entebbe Municipality appears to have better 
access to information. This probable explains the variation in accountability. People who are 
better informed get better accountability. 
5.2.2 Number of Civil Society Organizations/Community Based Organizations 
CSOs and CBOs play an important role in sensitizing the citizens about their rights. Data 
from the two local governments reveal that: 
In EMC, there are 661 CBOs and NGOs who engage the people through sensitization. These 
organizations also give the people the advantage of aggregate voice, so they are able to 
demand for accountability from their leaders. 
Figure 10: Organizations in the Municipality by operation 
 
Maracha district has only 8 NGOs working in the district. The challenge is that none of these 
NGOs has offices within the district. They are based in the neighbouring Arua, district. The 
district has also 8 CBOs listed in the DDP. Of these not much emphasis is put on 
accountability issues by the members. It is therefore hard for a group whose members feel 
powerless to foster accountability among their leaders 
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5.3 Local Government Capacity  
5.3.1 Proportion of Locally generated revenue:  
Local Governments Act 1997, Part IV (besides central government remittances) mandates 
local government to raise revenue locally through: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main reason behind this provision is that, often central government remittances in form 
of conditional or unconditional grants are either insufficient or are disbursed late. Therefore 
to enable Local governments run their activities, there is need to supplement central 
government funding with local sources.  
Backing the proposition of locally generated fund is the theoretical assumptions that, people 
are more inclined to seek accountability for financial resources that come from them. Based 
on this supposition, the study examined revenues in the selected local governments and 
results showed a variation between the cases. 
In Entebbe Municipal Council Local Government, locally generated revenue accounted for 
up to 20 percent of the total revenue collection for the Financial Year 2010/2011. This is a 
significant proportion of the budget contributed by the local people.  
We collect local revenue from various sources: we have the airport, hotels, whole 
sellers, retailers, law firms, government departments and local service tax as well as 
government ministries. These revenues contribute over 20 percent of the total 
revenue. We have streamlined collection of local revenue, to be done through the 
bank, therefore this has improved collection rate to over 84 percent, although 
enforcement is not that strong. 
(a) fees and fines on licences and 
permits in respect of any service 
rendered or regulatory power exercised 
by the local council; 
(b) interest on investments; 
(c) rents from lease of property owned 
by the local council; 
(d) fees and fines imposed by courts 
administered by the local council; 
(e) donations, contributions and 
endowments; 
(f) charges or profits arising from any  
 
 
trade, services or undertaking 
carried on by the local council; 
 (g) Annual bicycle licenses; 
(h) Parking fees; 
(i) advertisement fees; 
(j) cess on produce; 
(k) user charges where applicable; 
(l) fishing licenses; 
(m) agency fees; 
(n) charcoal burning licenses; and 
(o) any other revenue which may 
be prescribed by the local 
government and approved by the 
Minister. 
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Going by the theoretical arguments, people in the municipality are bound to find out how 
their money is being spent by the leadership. This explains their active participation in the 
budgeting process. 
In Maracha District, the situation is different. Central government transfers constituted 99 
percent of the total budget leaving only 1 percent being contributed by local sources. This 
therefore gives rise to people looking at the funds as “government money” delineating the 
responsibility of holding leaders accountable. One respondent had this to observe:  
The creation of new districts is overstretching the existing resources. The funds and 
capacity are not in place. We collect only 1 percent of the revenue locally. This 
mainly comes from market dues, tobacco holdage fees, trade licences and fines from 
pit sawyers. Local service tax, which was meant to replace graduated tax, has failed to 
take off....we have no hotels that qualify to pay taxes. What we have here are eating 
houses. There are no investments that are capable of paying royalties. 
Having little contribution from the local community makes it difficult for them (the local 
people) to seek accountability for funds they are not even aware that they do exist. The good 
proportion of locally generated funds has helped Entebbe Municipal Council to have more 
transparent revenue and expenditure management. For instance, performance reports were 
seen on the notice board. Another element of transparent revenue management that was 
examined was the participation in the budgetary process by the lower local governments and 
according to interview results, this is possible because Entebbe Municipal Council is able to 
generate a good percentage of its revenue locally, therefore allocate a fair amount to 
facilitation. One respondent testified: 
For facilitation, some money is given at times, though this may come too late. It 
enables us go to the divisions and wards, sit with the communities for the budgeting 
process. 
The case in with little funds generated locally has made the district heavily depend on central 
government transfers, which greatly affects performance and accountability. For instance, 
one respondent argues that:  
We reactive over 95 percent of the funds from the Central Government, but 
sometimes their (central government’s) expectations are unrealistic. We budget on 
indicative figures but the releases may not be adequate. Some of the releases at times 
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comes one month to the end of the financial year makes it difficult to account for the 
funds because, because the procurement process takes long.  
 Such gaps would have been addressed if there were adequate funds generated locally. 
5.3.2 Human Resource Capacity in internal audit department 
Capacity of the local government in this study is used in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. In qualitative terms, it refers to the right qualification among the bureaucratic and 
political leadership in local governments. Quantitatively, it refers to numbers that is whether 
all the required positions are filled as mandated by law. This is an element that affects 
performance of accountability.  
The Government of Uganda laid down procedures for employment in local governments. 
These are specified in the Public Survive Standing Order.  Minimum qualifications for 
technical and bureaucratic positions in both central and local governments are clearly spelt 
out. However, much as there is some level of uniformity in the laid out procedures, the entry, 
stay and exit of local government bureaucratic staff are managed by each District Service 
Commission. Accordingly, different local governments tend to perform differently.   
Data collected from Entebbe Municipal Council revealed that, the municipality comprises of 
7 departments with a total of 77 workers of which 47 are males and 30 females. It was further 
established that the Municipality is composed of 100% approved posts, 84% filled posts and 
16% vacant posts. The positions in the respective departments as shown in the table below 
Figure 11: Municipal staff approved, filled and vacant 
 
 
Interviews with respondents also confirmed that, the Municipality has attracted competent 
people given its central location. The quality of staff therefore reflects in the quality of 
performance and accountability. 
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We have the right people in the right places...all the staff qualified for the jobs they are doing 
and this partly explains why we are performing very well. There are just a few positions that 
haven’t been filled yet. 
 
The case in Maracha district is different. The researcher could not obtain a comprehensive 
record of staff as the District Personnel Officer was busy with Head Count of all government 
employees in the district, though he managed to give a brief interview.  According to 
respondents, the staffing levels are very low at the district. 
Our staffing levels are very low standing at 20-30 percent. In finance and planning 
department for instance, there our staffing level stands at 6 positions filled out of 19. Such 
low staff levels make it difficult to perform, therefore creating negative impacts on 
accountability as well.  
In requisites of quality, location of the local governments seems to play key a role in its 
performance and accountability. One respondent from Maracha District for instance had this 
to say: 
 
The rural location of the district is also a hindering factor to attracting good staff to this area. 
Most of the people want to work in the urban areas. Very few people are willing to come this 
way to the village, this partly explains the low levels of staff in different departments. You 
see we cannot even attract good contractors. Most of the contractors we get do not have either 
the money to implement projects or they lack the necessary technical competence to 
implement projects...at times we even provide them with tools to ensure that work gets done. 
Therefore it impacts on the way we deliver accountability to the central government, because 
then we cannot obtain the receipts, etc. Some of them do not even have invoices and receipts. 
Remote local governments also suffer the misfortune of inability to get competent firms to 
provide goods and services. They are only capable of attracting firms that are not competent 
enough.  The issue of capacity compromises quality of work and therefore accountability 
lines are compromised.  
 
Looking at the foregone discussions, the human resource capacity in Entebbe Municipal 
Council is much more than the one of Maracha District. In quantitative terms, the Entebbe 
Municipal Council has better personnel than Maracha. The qualitative aspect may be 
contentious but Entebbe Municipal council given its location has attracted more experienced 
technical staff than Maracha District. Entebbe’s Councilors seem to be more educated 
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(average qualification is graduate) and are better in matters of handling Council business 
given their levels of education. This assertion is supported by the call by almost all the 
respondents from Maracha calling for a minimum education level to be set for councilors 
(average education level is Ordinary level Certificate) given the testimony by many 
respondents that, councilors make a lot of mistakes therefore are not able to hold the technical 
staff accountable. Furthermore, participation of councilors in Maracha is also said to be 
limited though the respondents did not link this directly to education but internal bickering, it 
is certainly a factor contributing to their inputs. One respondent confessed than some of the 
councilors failed to read the oath. This therefore implies that capacity of the local government 
is an important factor creating variation in accountability. 
The effects of capacity can be seen directly on transparent revenue and expenditure 
management and participation.  
5.3.3 Ability to supervise bureaucratic staff 
Basic education is a fundamental human right and a component of well being. Education is 
also a key determinant of the lifestyle and status an individual enjoys in a society. Studies 
have consistently shown that educational level attained has a strong effect on the behavior 
and attitude of individuals. In general, the higher the level of education an individual has 
attained the more knowledge they have about the need and use of available facilities in their 
communities (EMC, 2010). The theoretical argument here is that, education plays a 
fundamental role in promoting sustainable development through capacity building in various 
skills, as well as raising awareness on various issues of National importance including the 
right to get accountability. 
 
Qualitative data from the two local governments showed significant differences in the literacy 
levels not only of political leadership but also overall average levels of education in the 
districts. 
In Entebbe Municipal Council, literacy rates are relatively high. Analytical report of 2002 
Population and Housing Census in Uganda indicated that, of all persons aged 10 years and 
above at 92% of the population aged 10 years and above was literate. Throughout the 
municipality men were found to be more literate (95%) as compared to their women (90%) 
counterparts. 
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Figure 12: Literacy rate for the population aged 10 years and above 
  Sex     
  Male Female Both Sexes 
Percent 94.6 90.5 92.5 
Source: 2002 Population and Housing Census Analytical report 
The case in Maracha District was quite different. The researcher found out that, the general 
level of literacy in the district was low. Data from Maracha indicates that, there are a number 
of social problems that affect the district. Notable among these are: 
 Low literacy levels among women in the community 
 High drop-out rate among  girls-child as compared to that of boy-child in schools 
 Poor and unfriendly sanitation in some schools 
 Defilement, forced/early marriages still on increase 
 High number of teenage mothers. 
Official data on literacy levels in Maracha were not readily available bust according to one of 
the respondents only 67 percent of the population is literate. 33 percent still need attention. 
The district has tried to institute Functional Adult Literacy but this seems not to make an 
impact particularly on men who shun the literacy classes. Such attitudes could have an impact 
on the population demanding for accountability from their leaders though one of the 
respondents disagrees: 
The problem is not education, the problem is politics 
The impact of education on political accountability cannot however be sidestepped. Most of 
the respondents who were interviewed agreed that in Uganda’s decentralisation system, 
political leaders are expected to supervise their bureaucrats who ought to render account to 
them. In the words of one of the respondents:  
The problem with our district is that, due to the generally low levels of literacy in the 
district, elected leaders generally have low levels of education with the highest level 
of education being the Local Council V chairperson who holds a bachelors degree. 
Most of the district councilors are Ordinary Level levers. They are not highly 
educated therefore technical staffs do not take them serous. You cannot expect a 
senior to render account to a junior.   
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Such scenarios definitely explain the variation in accountability in local governments in 
Uganda. 
Literacy levels have also affected legislation in Uganda’s local governments. According to 
the data gathered, participation in Council sessions is higher in Entebbe Municipal Council 
than Maracha District. One of the respondents the researcher talked to confirmed that there 
was not even a single ordinance passed by Maracha district council.   This is one factor that 
makes them less accountable than their counterparts in Entebbe because legislation is one 
cardinal role of the district council. Indeed some respondents attributed this poor performance 
to low literacy levels. 
5.4 Political history 
5.4.1 History 
In democratic and participatory political systems, an electoral competition is one opportunity 
to ensure political accountability. Theoretically, voting is seen to affect accountability in two 
ways: first, it may be a way to bring on board prospective candidates or a means to hold them 
accountable in that leaders who do not perform well are likely to lose elections. The Impact 
of electoral competition in a multiparty dispensation like Uganda is assessed through the 
number of political parties that win an election. This can be two fold, diverse political ideas 
can create recipe for political accountability or it could have negative impact if the views are 
too diverse. 
Studies have established a recent shift in power balance in Entebbe Municipal Council. For 
the last 18 years, Entebbe Municipal Council mayor has been a NRM (ruling government) 
candidate with majority of the councilors belonging to the ruling party.  DP won mayoral seat 
with majority of council seats in 2011. Such shift in the electorates taste for political party 
support could mean the ability of the electorate to hold their leaders accountable, thus 
supporting the claims that leaders who fail to perform are removed from office. 
 
The case in Maracha District is more or less the same but opposite. In Maracha, the dominant 
party until 2011 has been FDC (opposition). However in 2011, elections were won by NRM 
(ruling party). What is interesting here is the fact that all the councilors contested on NRM 
ticket were in fact the same individuals who moved from FDC to NRM.  
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The theoretical explanation for such trends is changing preferences. A key assumption is that 
voters’ preferences for parties change stochastically over time. The idea behind this 
assumption is that the emergence of new issues both at the national or local levels (a 
diplomatic crisis, emergence of a new technology with social implications, closure of a local 
factory, environmental problems, etc.) may shift the voters’ party identification and 
partisanship (Battaglini, 2013). In the case of Maracha, there was a change of party by the 
area Member of Parliament to the ruling government as a way of winning the attention of the 
ruling government because there was conflict over the location of the district headquarters for 
the newly granted district which was to be shared by Maracha and Terego Counties. This was 
indeed a diplomatic crisis. 
 
Therefore it could be the negative side of consensus building as all the councilors belong to 
the same party. The main problem with accountability here is complacency and party support, 
which negatively affects the institutional performance. There is fear to expose the party 
weaknesses outside the council, which would not have been the same if the there were 
representatives from other political parties. 
 
A separate study is however needed to establish the reasons behind the voters’ attitudes 
towards the political parties that initially dominated the selected local governments. The main 
focus of this particular study was to find out why there is a variation in accountability. 
 
Electoral competition certainly aids supervision ability and therefore is a cause of variation in 
accountability in the selected local governments. The good electoral performance of the 
opposition political party in the 2011 election could be linked to exposure of poor 
accountability in the municipality in 2010. This therefore can be attributed to the access of 
the media that was able to expose some of the vice. Though the reverse could be true in a 
situation of Maracha District where the media is not so pronounced, therefore information 
going to the electorate is censored. 
 
Socio-cultural institutions play a big role in bringing people together and aggregating their 
demands, yet the socio-cultural set up of the local communities tend to be ignored during 
accountability assessments. Cultural institutions reveal a long standing tradition of a people 
and it emphasises the role of informal practices as a cause of variation in local governments.   
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In terms of socio, economic and cultural conditions, the two local administrations varied 
greatly. They reflect a diversity of socio-economic and cultural conditions in Uganda. This 
verification supports the argument that, accountability relationships are entrenched in social 
environment, which is the core of this study.  
For purposes of this study, the researcher used three aspects to define social conditions: 
cultural diversity versus homogeneity, social conflicts and tradition of central rule. A look at 
the units of analysis reveals significant differences between Maracha and Entebbe on these 
fronts. 
Entebbe Municipal Council is culturally diverse. Being the gateway into Uganda and former 
administrative capital of the country, Entebbe’s population has a great variation in terms of 
cultural composition. It has both nationals and foreigners who serve in different government 
and international organizations. Maracha District on the other hand is inhabited by the 
indigenous people, the Maracha. The impact of this variation on accountability relations will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
Both Entebbe and Maracha did not record any cases of social conflicts. According the data 
collected, despite the cultural divergence in Entebbe, there are no cases of social conflicts 
recorded as one of the respondents observed:  
There may be individual cases of disagreements but we have not recorded any cases 
of ethnic conflicts. This I mainly attribute to the variation in cultures. Entebbe has no 
dominant group, although Luganda is widely used. We have people from the all parts 
of the country from the East, West North as well as Central. People live as brothers 
and sisters.  
Maracha District on the other hand is a homogenous society with the Lugbara as the 
dominant group. The Maracha are one group of the bigger Lugbara, who in turn are a section 
of the Nilotic Group from Sudan. Being a district inhabited by one group of people, it has 
little room for social conflicts. 
Conflicts noted in the district are mainly personal in nature and they do not affect the running 
of the district. When it was still Maracha-Terego District, there were cases of disagreement 
especially over the location of the district headquarters. One of the respondents noted: 
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Cases of social conflicts perhaps existed when there was that Maracha-Terego 
confusion. We however need to note that the idea of having this district came from 
two sources: first, the Maracha people asked for a district because they wanted to 
have services closer to the people. The Terego people on the other hand did not want 
a district but (secondly) were pushed by the rest of Arua District, because these two 
counties had the highest number of educated people in Arua district (and have always 
been competing) , therefore had occupied most of the administrative and employment 
positions in Arua. Looking at decentralisation synonymous with localization, the Arua 
people thought Maracha and Terego should be pushed into their own confusion, but 
Terego later opted out of the new district but went back to join the rest of Arua.  
The third constituent of tradition of centralised rule is part and partial of Entebbe Municipal 
Council’s majority population-the Baganda. Entebbe is part of the Buganda Kingdom, where 
administrative, legislative and judicial powers were centralized in the hands of the Kabaka 
(king of Buganda). Later the Municipality became the administrative headquarters of Uganda 
and still retains some of the key government holdings including the State House. This 
therefore reflects a long tradition of central control. 
Maracha district on the other hand has a different arrangement, best described by this excerpt 
(UgandaTravelGuide, 2012).  
The highest social political organization among the Lugbara was the clan. The clan 
was normally headed by a clan leader called Opi. All members of the same clan 
claimed descent form a common ancestor to whom they were paternally related. All 
the elders of the clan exercised influence over political and social affairs and they had 
powers to curse and punish any of their subordinates. Every married man had 
authority over his wives and children and even after his sons had married, he still had 
power over them and their children. The Lugbara had a patronage system called 
Amadingo whereby the poor or the destitute were treated as members of the family 
and they could be given land if they wished to stay. Bride wealth would even be paid 
for them by their hosts if they wished to marry during their clientele. 
Such relations could have affected the way accountability is looked at in the selected local 
governments and this is the main preoccupation of the chapter that follows. 
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5.4.2 Leadership  
Elite capture is where resources transferred designated for the benefit of the larger population 
are usurped by a few individuals of superior status - be it economic, political, educational, 
ethnic, or otherwise (Dutta, 2009). This is a common phenomenon in decentralisation 
especially in developing countries, Uganda is not an exception. 
 
The vice of elite capture is a common phenomenon in many local governments. There are 
various cases where government officials divert local resources for personal use. This case 
has affected both local governments. Media reports have implicated officials from Entebbe 
Municipal Council for failure to account for the municipality funds. See: URN (2010) 
“Entebbe Town Clerk Chased from Parliament Again”. This case might not have constituted 
a major threat to the accountability rating of the municipality because it did not affect Central 
Government disbursement directly, probably the reason that despite such anomalies, Entebbe 
emerged as the best performing upper local government in the country 
 
Evidence from Maracha revealed a different picture in Maracha District. Here the challenge 
is perhaps leadership at the lower levels. One of the respondents had this to say: 
With accountability, the problem is at times sheer neglect of attachment of receipts to 
reports. Reports are sent without necessary attachments.  We also have problems with 
NUSAF accountability. The 6
th
 Cycle of funds should have been given but because of 
incomplete accountability it hasn’t been given as the policy stipulates that the balance 
should be less than 50 million. The district has balance of more than 100 million. 
Communities are given money and they vanish, there is a problem with the attitude of 
our people. 
 This is a clear case of elite capture that affects most of the local governments under 
decentralization system. The complexity with managing resources in a multi level 
government compounds the problem. Maracha’s problem could be worsened by the number 
of lower local governments they have to deal with to serve the interests of the 200,000 people 
as opposed to Entebbe’s 55,000. 
 
Rent seeking behaviors are also seen in contractual kickbacks. In the first year, Maracha 
District in operated without the Contracts Committee, because they did not have a district 
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service commission in place to appoint the Contracts Committee. This could have left the 
district at the mercy of individuals, some of whom were working in acting capacity. 
 
This clearly has implication on the overall ranking of the district in terms of accountability. 
The problem could have been exacerbated by the fact that NUSAF funds constitute a 
reasonable percentage of the district’s revenue. 
 
Information obtained from respondents also indicate that the current shortage of human 
resource in the district is partly linked to the attitude of some leaders who wanted to employ 
people from the Maracha, though applicants from other places could have filled the vacant 
positions before Public Service Ministry put a ban on recruitment of public service 
employees. Such attitudes not only reduce the concept of decentralization to localization but 
also compound the problem of rent seeking in such local administrative areas. 
5.5 Informal practices a forgotten variable? 
Decentralization has led to extensive government contracting for service delivery which has 
in turn resulted in side street dependence on private service providers. Contractual service 
delivery involves complex accountability dynamics. Scholars have tended to underline formal 
aspects of accountability in intergovernmental relations, paying attention to design of contract 
terms, performance measures, reporting relationships, and predetermined penalty for 
deviation. Inter organizational and interpersonal behaviours that reveal informal 
accountability have been sidestepped (Romzek et al., 2009).  
 
As local governments are called upon to provide services to the citizens, service delivery has 
shifted from the traditional single-agency hierarchies to networks of contractual providers. 
This shift in the predominant coordination mechanism from bureaucracy to collaboration has 
underscored the importance of inter-organizational and interpersonal negotiations. Though 
local governments are formally structured, they contain elements of self-governance that is 
enabled by informal systems of rules, trust and reciprocity norms, credible commitments, and 
informal mechanisms for rewarding or punishing those who violate rules and norms or defect 
on commitments (Ostrom et al., 1994).  
Informal accountability emerges from the unofficial expectations and discretionary behaviors 
that result from repeated interactions among network members in recognition of their 
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interdependence in pursuit of their shared goal(s)(Romzek et al., 2009). Local government 
participants are often linked at the individual level through inter personal relationships, 
professional associations and memberships, and participation in local task forces, advisory 
committees or other forms of policy and planning networks related to their industry. These 
social connections foster relationships that can provide mutual benefit, reduce transaction 
costs of future collaboration, and solidify a sense of shared norms and mutual accountability 
among the participants(Romzek et al., 2009).  
Informal accountability in local governments involves service providers being held to answer 
by local government partners for meeting performance expectations regarding their programs 
and clients. Just like the interpersonal relationships are informal, so too are the performance 
expectations; they are unofficial shared expectations. The interpersonal behaviours involved 
are discretionary rather than those mandated by official agreements. So, too, are the rewards 
and sanctions of informal accountability (Romzek et al., 2009). Such relationships tend to be 
elusive in nature, therefore impacting on the performance rating of local governments units 
that use them as modus operandi. 
Elsewhere, studies have shown essential concerns of accountability with a hub on three basic 
features of the relationship: (1) the sources of authority to which the organization or 
individual is answerable for performance, (2) those authorities’ expectations for the 
accountable entity’s performance, and (3) the mechanisms by which the entity is accountable 
is held answerable for performance and faces appropriate consequences. These same features 
are relevant for organizational actors operating within local government as well as central 
government networks and reflect the more complex relationships (Romzek et al., 2012:443). 
See also (Bardach and Lesser 1996; Behn 2001; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Schillemans 
2008). Common norms influence the functioning and sustainability of the informal 
accountability mechanisms. These include among others trust, reciprocity, and respect for 
institutional territory (Romzek et al., 2012:445). 
In Uganda, formal intergovernmental relations between the centre and the periphery are spelt 
out in the Local Governments Act 1997. However, many local governments find themselves 
compelled to pursue informal rather than the formal mechanisms which are seen to be either 
cumbersome or impracticable, or less supportive of local needs. The basis of these challenges 
seem to be what (Romzek et al., 2012) referred to as shared norms. 
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Studies conducted in selected local governments in Uganda in Entebbe Municipal Council 
and Maracha District revealed that the focus on informal accountability mechanisms created a 
major rift in the way local governments are considered to be accountable or less accountable 
by the Central Government. This is because informal practices tend to be not only area 
specific but also case specific. This makes it hard to get similarities in occurrences across 
local governments. Informal practices therefore are the major cause of variation in local 
government accountability.  
While Entebbe Municipal Council ‘officially’ places a lot of emphasis on formal 
accountability, leaders in Maracha District seem to be more concerned with informal 
mechanisms, which they feel are more responsive to local needs and more practical to their 
area. 
Informal accountability mechanisms play important roles in interpersonal and inter 
organizational relationships in both Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District Local 
governments especially for the political leadership. These informal practices hinge around the 
threefold factor identified earlier that is: the sources of authority to which the organization or 
individual is answerable for performance, those authorities’ expectations for the accountable 
entity’s performance, and the mechanisms by which the accountable entity is held answerable 
for performance and faces appropriate consequences 
Qualitative evidence from Entebbe Municipal Council reveals that, there is official emphasis 
on formal accountability.  One respondent provided this example:  
We provide accountability through internal assessments. We give them reporting 
formats which have to match the requirements of the ministry...you know, they want 
to see good reports. The challenges we have to address are: we are expected to give 
good reports yet most times people wait for last minute to do something. Sometimes 
they do not even want to do what they are told to do.  Meeting deadlines is therefore a 
challenge. But we try to follow all the accountability guidelines from the ministry.  
In yet another quest for accountability, the municipality carries out regular audits. In the 
F/Y2009/010, two lower local government units and 8 departments at the municipality 
headquarters were audited. There were also 14 schools and 4 health units audited in the same 
period of time (EMC, 2010). All these are carried out in line with the formal accountability 
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requirements from the Ministry. Such requirements include strategic plans as a basis for final 
evaluation. 
 
In Entebbe for example, the municipal technical planning committee as well as audit 
departments developed broad objectives, strategies, priority actions and a monitoring & 
evaluation framework through which successful implementation would be achieved. These 
objectives include  
1. To ensure constant monitoring and surveillance of local government to enforce 
compliance with Accounting Regulation.  
2. To ensure timely accountability of government funds.  
3. To ensure timely writing of books of accounts for Municipal and lower local 
government, administrative units and departments.  
4. To ensure that there is value for money on all government funds.  
5. To ensure compliance with procurement procedures 
 
These objectives are aligned to the traditional bureaucratic approach of accountability. 
Entebbe being one of the oldest administrative centres of power has been at the  
 
On the contrary, at times such plans make little impact as local leaders are inclined to respond 
to local needs where they feel more obliged. Observation was one important tool employed 
by this study. During the interview process, the researcher realized that informal 
accountability practices too played a fundamental role in Entebbe Municipal Council. One 
such incidence was many of the interviews scheduled with the municipal leadership did not 
take place.   
 
The case in Maracha District is not far from Entebbe. Informal practices influence 
accountability plays an important role in accountability performance. Leaders here see 
informal practices as the only way of providing services efficiently and effectively. Some of 
the respondents for instance had this to say: 
Being in a remote location, we cannot attract bids from competent firms. Most of the 
contractors we have lack capacity, both in terms of finance and human resource. 
There is no proper management system among the contractors. This as such affects 
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our reports because we receive the next grant after submitting the report for the 
previous one. Some of them rush to take contracts in many sub counties.  
The implication of this finding is that, because there are few contractors and already the 
attitude that the local government is unable to attract competent contractors means they end 
up hand picking contractors to do their work. This predicament affects transparency in the 
procurement system, therefore affecting transparency in revenue and expenditure in the 
process. 
 
The study further established that in an attempt to cope with the pressure of providing 
services, local governments at times devise means to ensure the contractors who already have 
low capacity can deliver. One respondent attested to this: 
We provide them (the contractors) with tools for constructions because most of them 
do not have the necessary equipments. It has worked for us because in 2010, we had 
only 92 kilometers of road network but today, we have 200 kilometers of road 
network. In addition we have built two big bridges, designed the council complex, this 
would have cost us a lot of money if we contracted another person… 
 Such discretionary measures have implications for the overall accountability rating of the 
local government yet it is an important performance tool. As the district gives out its own 
tools and equipment to be used by contractors, the contractor may either contribute to ware 
and tear of the equipments or the district fails to account for all the funds in its possession as 
it becomes difficult to give accountability for ware and tare caused by third parties.  
 
Another fascinating case of informal practices adopted by Maracha District was distribution 
of seeds to the local people. This was seen by the leaders as a measure to ensure accountable 
and responsive governance. This indeed could be looked at as a response to the popular cry 
for poverty as many people are unable to even get seeds to plant. However, the understanding 
and conduct of the citizens paints a different picture.  One respondent commented:  
As a general statement, the district has brought services nearer to the people. It was 
given to appease the voters who demanded for it (the district) but also Maracha is 
densely populated. The successes are that, it has united the people; government 
programs are easily managed and implemented and there is now fast and better 
accountability despite challenges….We give them seeds to plant… but it frustrating 
that people at times eat these seeds... We have also been distributing potato 
vines…these red vines you may have seen as you come along the road….but our 
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people sell these potato vines cheaply. For instance potato vines which we buy for 
Shillings 30,000 is sold for as cheap as Shillings 4,000. So it is other people 
benefiting from our initiatives. So if one comes three months down the road, to check 
the potatoes, there is nothing to show as people sell these vines to those coming from 
neighboring districts like Koboko and Yumbe and even South Sudan. 
 
Informal practices are embedded in almost all measures of accountability this study adopted. 
It ranges from informal practices in managing local government revenue and expenditure 
management, responsiveness to local needs, participation in council meetings and electoral 
processes as well as participation in civil society groups. In other words, all these activities 
are either reinforce by or stifled by informal practices. 
 
The problem of informal practices is linked to the medium of communication and its 
availability. There is no specific type of communication means for official passage of 
information in local governments. This has led to each local government resorting to any 
means they deem appropriate. Coupled with other factors, urban local governments enjoy 
better access to information compared their rural counterparts.  It is was for instance easier to 
capture the misappropriation of funds in Entebbe Municipal Council in the media but the 
poor citizen who lost his land to the district of Maracha did not have the luck of having his 
plight highlighted. Therefore availability of information has greatly contributed to the 
variation in accountability in local governments. 
 
Responsive government is the aspiration of every local government. Informal practices are a 
convenient way to ensure responsive government as the leaders in Maracha district for 
instance try to put measures as safety nets against the poverty and food shortage being 
experienced by their people. This is a unique problem with the district; therefore it 
necessitated a homegrown solution. However, as the measure is informal, and there are no 
sanctions and perhaps the local people were not consulted on the how they wanted their 
poverty problems solved, they ended up misusing the opportunity they are given. Money 
spent on potato vines for instance may have receipts and other documentation needed but 
when value for money audit is done by looking at the food security situation in the district, it 
perhaps remains among the poorest districts. This is because the electorate or citizens for that 
matter do not see sense in the leaders providing food for tomorrow when they have no food 
for today. This explains the variation in accountability among local governments. 
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Informal practices that mean accountability to the local people may not necessarily be 
recognized in the official local government rankings. The researcher for instance found out 
that, the electorate considers a leader to be accountable if he or she is able to attend social and 
cultural functions.  
 
In Entebbe for instance, nearly all the offices were closed as both local bureaucrats and 
politicians went to attend a meeting in preparation for the visit of the “Kabaka” (king of 
Buganda Kingdom). This supports the assertion of the origin of authority as the subjects of 
the king make up majority of the voters in the municipality; therefore their presence was very 
important. The bureaucrats owe their allegiance to the political leadership, therefore ‘showing 
their presence’ in planning the visit of the cultural leader of the area was important.  
 
An interview with one of the respondents was also canceled without notice as the interviewee 
had to go and attend a burial ceremony in his area. This is crucial because the presence of a 
leader in such functions is seen as important and it is seen as a form of “accountability” to the 
local people. Such cases are not however recorded when it comes to accountability to the 
central government where performance indicators originate. Such practices do not feature 
anywhere on the functions of a local councilor but certainly do affect their performance of 
their functions therefore creating variation. 
5.6 Control Variables: Fiscal and legal framework, a cause of variation? 
The analysis in this section is intended to mitigate the key expounding variable from other 
factors that might be offering competitive explanations for variation in performance of 
accountability. We shall consider two important institutional factors: availability of fiscal 
resources and the legislation. 
5.6.1 Availability of fiscal resources: 
There is great discrepancy between the affluent and the underprivileged local governments in 
terms of the available funds for spending. In Uganda, while some local governments, 
especially the urban local governments are well endowed with fiscal resources others 
particularly the rural local governments are struggling. This variation tends to offer 
competing explanation for variation in accountability performance across local governments. 
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As this study recognizes this reality, its impact on accountability performance is held constant 
so as to isolate the variables that explain variation in accountability performance. 
Data obtained from Entebbe for instance revealed that, the annual budget of the Municipality 
for 2010/2011 Financial Year stood at 10,582,809,812. In terms of population,  
According to the population projections from UBOS, the population of Entebbe 
Municipality stood at 70,200 persons (51.4% females and 48.6% Males) in 2008 and 
73,100 persons for 2009. Entebbe’s population size has been increasing at an average 
annual growth rate of 2.2%.The population now stands at 76,500 people, (48.6%male, 
51.45% female) in the Municipality and its projected to be at 83,200, people by 2012 
(EMC, 2010).  
This therefore gives Entebbe the per capita budgetary expenditure of Uganda Shillings 
138,337 (US$ 0.05). Compared to the national per capita Uganda shillings 2,445 (US$ 0.92) 
for the same period Entebbe’s per capita is much less but a good average compared to other 
local governments. 
 
The case of Maracha is a typical situation in many of the rural local governments. According 
to information obtained from the district, its population stood at 199,300  
Figure 13: Maracha District Land Area by LLGs 
S/No. DISTRICT/ SUB COUNTY. Total Area 
Sq. Km. 
No. Of 
LC IIs. 
No. Of 
LC Is. 
Population statistics 2012 
Males Females Total 
1. Yivu 64 8 64 12,900 13,900 26,800 
2. Maracha TC. 0 4 17 4,320 4,834 9,154 
3. Nyadri 51 3 59 9,980 11,166 21,146 
4.. Oleba 68 6 78 15,100 16,800 31,900 
5. Oluvu 70 6 62 15,200 17,200 32,400 
6. Tara 48 5 40 9,200 10,000 19,200 
7. Oluffe 70 6 43 11,000 12,400 23,400 
8. Kijomoro 70 6 44 16,700 18,600 35,300 
 DISTRICT. 441 44 407 94,400 104,900 199,300 
NB: Area of Maracha Town Council is included under Nyadri Sub County. Source: CUAM Mapping 2006. 
The annual expenditure estimates for the district was Uganda Shillings 11,760,975,000.00. 
This therefore gives the district a per capita expenditure of Uganda Shillings 59,012 (US$ 
0.02). This falls far below the national average per capita of Uganda shillings 2,445 (US$ 
0.92). Coupled with other factors like the source of revenue of which 99 percent of which 
comes from the central government, the performance of accountability is bound to be low. 
This study however held such consequences constant with the assumption that, there is a 
mechanism to compensate for the low funds in the rural local governments. 
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The argument here is that, when funds are readily available, local governments tend to be 
more responsive in providing for the needs of the local government. They will also easily 
involve the community as they are aware that the demands will be met. This argument is 
supported by the views of the respondents in both local governments.  
In Entebbe Municipal Council, one respondent submitted that:  
People propose a number of projects. There is fair facilitation, not much 
bureaucracy…we follow the e guidelines from the Ministry of Local Government. 
This is aided by the high literacy rates. But the challenges are that we have limited 
funding. There are high expectations from the population so when you don’t meet 
their proposals, they tend to get discouraged so next time they are not willing to 
participate. Another problem also is that at times the money comes in too late and this 
affects implementation. 
Similar views were expressed in Maracha District, where respondents argued that they budget 
on indicative figures and in the course of the financial year, there tends to be budget cuts. 
Such jeopardize the trust local people have in their leadership.  
One major problem is that finance is not decentralized. There are now recentralization 
tendencies. Over 99 percent of the revenue comes from the central government and 
most of these are conditional grants over which we have no control at the district. For 
proper accountability, participation is important, but facilitation is needed for 
participation but we do not have the funds or the mandate to allocate these funds. The 
focus should be realistic accountability. Politicians should not promise beyond what 
they can provide… 
We see here that local governments do recognize the importance of fiscal resources in 
facilitating accountability. However, we shall not attach weight to the impact this variable on 
the two selected cases. This will help us isolate the critical factors in explaining this variation. 
Part of the reason for this is the overall position of local government revenue in relation to the 
national budget. Indeed one respondent from Maracha District confessed:  
Though responsibilities have been decentralized, finance is not decentralized. The 
share of national budget that goes to local governments is only 21 percent. We are 
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trying to engage them by advocating for more funds but recentralization tendencies 
are emerging. 
5.6.2 Legislation 
The legal framework within which local governments operate is also an important factor that 
could have impact accountability in local governments. This study held this factor constant in 
order to isolate its impact on the functioning of local government accountability. The problem 
with legislation is that, at times they are not comprehensive enough. This gives room for 
informal practices to emerge in local governments, therefore taking a lion’s share of the 
policy influence.  
The main role of the legal framework is to define the relationship that exists among the 
different actors in the governments. Legal framework defines accountability relationships that 
is who is answerable to whom. The challenge with legal framework is that at times they tend 
to be scanty, offering no details, therefore giving room for a lot of discretion for leaders at the 
local level. Such weaknesses in the legal framework give end up creating a lot of 
discrepancies in the decisions made across the country. 
Uganda’s local government relations are embedded in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Uganda, 1995 and the Local Governments Act, 1997. The main aim of these laws was to 
stipulate a uniform working structure for local governments in Uganda. The laws prescribe 
the leadership structure for both the rural and urban local governments. This therefore ideally 
offers a uniform ground for all local governments to operate.  
Article 9 clause 1 of the Local Governments Act stipulates that: “A council shall be the 
highest political authority within the area of jurisdiction of a local government and shall have 
legislative and executive powers to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and this 
Act. Article 2 stipulates that: “A person shall not be a member of a local government council 
unless that person is a citizen of Uganda”. 
The Information obtained from the local governments and a review of the existing laws 
reveals that, the local councils have no minimum qualifications yet they are the highest 
political authority in their areas of jurisdiction. In the words of the respondents:  
The problem is many of our councilors are not experienced in handling government 
business. There is some support from the elected leaders though at times they want 
technical issues handled politically...It think minimum qualification is important for 
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the political leaders...most of them are O Level leavers though many of them have 
enrolled for courses now. The technical staffs have their standards and qualifications 
set by the Ministry of Public Standing orders. 
Such loopholes in the legal system for sure could contribute substantially to the variation in 
accountability in local government, but we shall hold it constant, but rather treat the impact 
under the informal practices. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In a nutshell, variation in accountability performance across local governments is linked to 
what this study refers to as institutional environmental factors.  These factors are further 
divided into institutional factors and functioning of the institutions. It was however important 
to control for the impact of some of the institutional factors that cut across the board as they 
tend to provide rivalling explanations for variation in accountability. These specifically 
included the legal framework and the availability of fiscal resources. 
Findings of the study revealed that the main explanatory factor is the informal practices 
among the local governments. Given the weak and in comprehensive local government 
legislation, local government leaders tend to use their discretion solve certain issues. This 
problem is also exacerbated by the lack of capacity in some of the local governments in 
qualitative and quantitative terms, therefore giving room for inexperienced politicians to rise 
to the ranks of making important decisions. This in turn gives way to informal practices thus 
causing variation in accountability in local governments across the country. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 COMPARISON OF ENTEBBE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND MARACHA 
DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District local governments have a number of 
similarities in terms of accountability performance. The two local governments however by 
and large are different. In this chapter, the study will outline the main similarities and 
differences between the two local governments. This chapter is a recap of the two preceding 
ones. The first part outlines the main similarities and in the second, the main differences 
between the two local governments under study. 
6.2 Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District Local Governments, what is 
common? 
 Both Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District are upper local governments. 
Therefore they are guided by the same local governments act, with similar 
administrative structures. 
 Transparent Public Revenue and Expenditure-Access to Information: The two local 
governments use notice boards, radios and local councilors as a means to reach to the 
communities. Therefore, there is some similarity in the medium of communication as 
a measure of transparency. Newspapers could be seen in both local governments 
thought the major difference remains the proportion of population that can access the 
newspapers. 
 Responsiveness/Representativeness: Both local governments have initiated measures 
to ensure responsive service provision measures although the measures vary because 
the local needs are different. 
 Participation: Local politics and Electorate incentives: both local governments have 
been at one time either opposition political party or ruling party political party 
strongholds. 
 The two selected local governments have civil society involvement. However the 
degree of engagement by the civil society varies significantly. 
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6.3 Differences between Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District Local Governments 
 ENTEBBE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MARACHA DISTRICT 
1. Transparent Public Revenue and Expenditure-Access to Information 
Means of Communication  Main means of communication are Radio, television, 
notice boards, office messengers, News papers, 
maintains a website 
 Main means of communication is Radio 
talk shows 
Access to News Papers  Both local and national news papers are readily 
accessible 
 Only national news papers are accessed by 
a few individuals 
Public Access to Internet  Internet in the municipality is readily accessible  Internet is not readily accessible except in 
district offices on modems. 
Audits  Evidence of audit of lower local governments and 
institutions such as schools and health units 
 No evidence of audit of lower local 
governments except the town council. 
Display of information on Notice 
Board 
 Tenders, reports and announcements are posted on the 
notice board 
 Approved projects not posted on public 
notice boards, IPFs not posted on public 
notice board. 
Responsiveness/Representativeness 
Setting priorities  Communities set their own priorities in the budgeting 
process 
 Demand side not active 
Local Initiatives  Local initiatives include collecting revenue through 
bank accounts in an attempt to improve collection 
which would in turn be used to provide services. 
 Distribution of seeds, however 
communities either eat or sell these seeds 
2. Participation: Local politics and Electorate  incentives 
Participation by Councilors   EMC has a vibrant and active Council. Councilors 
attend sessions and actively participate in enacting 
 There is participation is participation but 
this is quite low as many of the Councilors 
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bye-laws, discussing the budget etc lack confidence and experience in handling 
government business.  
Electoral process, outcome and 
voting 
 Majority of the ruling government party members lost 
in the most recent elections. Majority of the councilors 
now belong to Democratic Party, yet this used to be a 
ruling government stronghold. This is an indication of 
people holding leaders accountable 
 Council is 100 percent ruling party (NRM) 
councilors. Most of those who were 
formerly opposition FDC party members 
were returned as NRM candidates after 
crossing with the area Member of 
Parliament o the ruling government 
Participation/consultation in 
budgeting process 
 Communities are consulted and participate and give 
their priorities 
 People are not involved  
3. Participation: Civil Society 
 
Community Development Groups  Total number of CBOs and NGOs 557  Total number of CBOs and NGOs  16 
Women’s Participation  Reasonably good participation. There are a total of 557 
CBOs and NGOs  with 136 targeting women 
 Low participation of women in decision- 
making process particularly in  
planning/budgeting, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation-  community 
meetings 
Activism  People are willing to participate in government 
projects 
 People do not want to participate 
4. Physical, Social and Political factors 
Location  Entebbe Municipal Council lies on the northern 
shoreline of Lake Victoria, Africa's largest lake. It lies 
at 0.0500N, 32.4600E (Latitude: 0° 3' 0.00"; 
Longitude: 32° 27' 36.00"). The Municipality is 
located in Wakiso District, just about 37 kilometres 
(23 mi), southwest of Kampala, Uganda's capital and 
 Maracha District is found in the North 
Western region lying between Arua and 
Koboko Districts. Its District headquarters 
and Commercial Town is in Maracha Town 
Council. 
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largest city. The Municipality is located on a peninsula 
into Lake Victoria covering a total area of 56.2 square 
kilometres (21.7 sq mi), out of which 20 square 
kilometres (7.7 sq mi) is water. 
 The municipality is a peninsular at an altitude of 
1200m – 1325m above sea level and is on a low land 
of Precambrian crystalline basement of geniuses and 
quartzite. It has a humid tropical climate with mean 
monthly temperatures between 25
o
C and 27
o
C. Lake 
Victoria and Taita bay are in the South East and West 
of Entebbe respectively.  
 Maracha District is bordered by Koboko 
District in the North, Yumbe District in the 
North East, Democratic Republic of Congo 
in the West and by Arua District in the 
South and South east. The District’s exact 
location is as illustrated in the map below.  
 The District has an approximate total area 
of 441Square Kilometres according to 
service map produced by CUAM in 2006. 
About 2.09% (0.92sq.km) of the total land 
is occupied by forests, water bodies and 
hills. Leaving a total of 440.08 square 
kilometres as the available habitable and 
arable land. 0.02 sq. Km of the total land is 
occupied by water bodies and wetlands. 
Political History 
 
 Entebbe municipality obtained its name from the 
Luganda word “Entebbe‟ (denotating “seat” or 
“chair‟) which consigns the rock seats on the seashore 
of Lake Victoria which were carved by Mugula, a 
Muganda traditional Chief in the early 18th century 
 Entebbe  was capital city of Uganda in 1894 following 
a decision in 1893 by the colonial Governor Sir Gerald 
Portal to relocate from Kampala to Entebbe 
 Maracha District was created in 2009/10 
financial year and started operations in 
from 1
st
 July 2010/11 financial year.  
 It was a Reward for support to the ruling 
government 
 
Population: 199,300 
 
 According to the 2002 Population and housing census, 
the municipality has a population of 55,086. However, 
the population is estimated to be at 76,000 in 2012 
 Population of Maracha District stood at 
199,300 at the time of data collection 
according to information obtained from the 
district. 
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Formal Education :  Literacy rates at Entebbe Municipality are 92%. 
Quality of education is good as the Municipality 
houses some of the best performing schools in the 
country. 
 Literacy rates of Maracha stood at 67%. 
This is basic education as the quality of 
education is still a challenge. 
Socio Economic Set up 
 
 The population comprises mainly of civil servants, 
contractors, casual labourers, pensioners, artisan, brick 
makers, vehicle repairers, fisher folk, farmers, traders, 
hoteliers and aviation related occupations 
 Only 12% live below poverty line. 
 Traditionally Buganda region had a centralised 
governance under the kingship 
 Agriculture employs over 80% of the 
population. They tilt small holdings of 
approximately 2 acres 
 Data obtained Information from the district 
indicates that 51.3% of the district 
population lives below poverty line. 
 The highest political organisation of the 
Lugbara people is the clan 
Local Revenue  
 
 17% of total budget comes from local collections. 
 83% of the total income is remitted by the Central 
government.  
 The Municipality boasts of 84% revenue collection 
rate 
 1% of total budget Local and 99% Central 
government  
 Central government contributes 99 percent 
of the revenue in the local government. 
 Revenue collection rate at the district is 
only 30 percent 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.0 SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
This final chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a summary of the study as an 
attempt to recap the whole study. The key empirical findings of the study of variation in 
accountability in local governments are revisited. The second part focuses on interpretation of 
research findings and implications of the same findings to theory and further research. The 
recommendations in this section are based on responses from interviews, which we 
conducted in the local governments. We therefore hope that these recommendations can help 
improve performance of accountability. 
7.2 Summary of Chapters of the thesis 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
What started as an instrument to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
governance, has gradually become a goal in itself. Nowadays, accountability has become a 
‘Good Thing’, which it seems we cannot have enough of (Pollitt, 2003:89, Bovens, 2006). 
Despite claims like these by scholars, there is still great disparity in accountability across 
local governments. Thus the main research problem of this study is: why are some local 
governments more accountable than others? Therefore; what are the different 
indicators/forms/dimensions of accountability in Uganda’s local governments? And what 
factors make accountability of some local governments thrive while others fall short of 
accountability? 
7.2.2 Revisiting the Model 
7.2.3 The Principal-Agent model 
To help find answers to these questions, we used the Principal-Agent Model, which is often 
used in accountability relations, to develop our own analytical framework. The key argument 
of the Principal-Agent model is that one party that is the agent, who is the accounter (who 
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renders account) is answerable to the principal who is the accountee (to whom account is 
rendered). The model has two major assumptions: (i) that the agents tend to pursue their own 
goals and (ii) that the agents have more information than their principals, therefore this makes 
them less accountable. In our case of local government studies, we look at the citizens as the 
principals and the local politicians and bureaucrats as their agents. Howlwett et al., (2009) 
claim that one major criticism of the Principal Agent Model is the tendency to identify more 
with the needs of the agents than the principals on whose behalf they act.  
7.2.3.1 The Literature 
We conceptualize accountability as a relationship between an actor and a forum, whereby the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor can be sanctioned. These claims are enriched by a 
number of scholarly works (Brinkerhoff, 2001, Brinkerhoff, 2004, Mulgan, 2000, Schedler, 
1999, Eckardt, 2008, Bovens, 2005, Bovens, 2006, Bovens, 2010)  to mention but a few. 
Dubnick (2002) emphasizes the centrality of accountability in modern public management 
and in another work,  Romzek and Dubnick (1987) draws distinctions between the different 
types of accountability as political or democratic, bureaucratic, legal and financial 
accountability. In this study we focus on both political and bureaucratic forms of 
accountability. Bovens in many of his works (2006;2006;2010)  (and especially the 2010 
work) further deepens the understanding of accountability as (i) a virtue, which focuses on 
standards of behavior of public actors and (ii) as a mechanism with a focus relations or 
interaction of actors. Our analysis draws elements of both types of accountability.  
The major limitations of most of the scholarly works on accountability which we reviewed 
are that first, they do not operationalize accountability and secondly they are mainly 
theoretical and not empirical studies. Therefore it has been quite a challenge for us to develop 
operational indicators for the variables in this study. Nevertheless we have managed to 
construct a conceptual framework. 
7.2.4 Return to the Conceptual Framework 
In our analytical framed work, we operationalize accountability which is our dependent 
variable into three dimensions namely: transparency, participation and complaints and 
response mechanisms. These dimensions are a modification of the Global Accountability 
Project (GAP) Framework, which has been developed by One World Trust, a charity that 
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conducts research on practical ways to make global organisations more responsive to the 
people they affect, and on how the rule of law can be applied equally to all. The GAP 
Framework uses a broad, active notion of accountability and applies it to large transnational 
organizations. It identifies four core dimensions that make an organization more accountable 
to its stakeholders: transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint and response 
mechanisms. Lloyd et al., (2007:11) argue that each of these four dimensions indicates a 
standard for accountable behavior . We left out evaluation in our model.  
Transparency necessitates ‘the provision of accessible and timely information [like local 
government revenue, expenditure, audit reports and reviews, as well as work plans, approved 
projects and tenders] to stakeholders and the opening up of organizational procedures, 
structures, and processes to their assessments’. Participation entails ‘the active engagement 
of both internal and external stakeholders [through leadership change, many-party 
representation on council, attendance of public meetings and involvement in civil society 
activities] in the decisions and activities that affect them’. And Complaints and response 
mechanisms entail ‘channels developed by organisations that enable stakeholders to file 
complaints on issues of non-compliance or against decisions and actions, and ensure such 
complaints are properly reviewed and acted upon[by functioning and use of appropriate 
organs such as Inspectorate of Government and Local Governments Public Accounts 
Committee]’. To be accountable, an organisation must integrate these dimensions into its 
policies, procedures and practice at all levels and stages of decision-making and 
implementation, in relation to both internal and external stakeholders.  The GAP Framework 
was developed specifically for transnational actors but we use some of its dimensions to 
assess whether our local government actors are accountable. Although this has been done 
with adaptation of the various operationalisations and modification indicators to fit the 
specific political and institutional context of our actors as recommended by Bovens 
(2010:958-960).  
 
We also operationalized our independent variables and they include citizens’ awareness, 
local government capacity and political history.  
Citizens Awareness entails public or ordinary knowledge or understanding about 
accountability issues which at times involve many bodies or organizations who try to "raise 
awareness". The role of media of spreading political news and public information is crucial. 
Radios are a key medium at the local level, providing local news, talk shows and question 
and answer programmes to literate and illiterate, rich and poor citizens alike (Devas and 
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Grant, 2003). We therefore use the variety of communication mechanisms such as radio, 
television and newspapers among others as indicators of awareness. The challenge with local 
media though is that, often they do not have resources to undertake investigative journalism, 
a lot of which focus on issues of public accountability. The number of civil society 
organizations/ community based organizations (CBOs) is also used as an indicator because 
these CBOs play a vital role in creating public awareness at the grassroots. Civil society can 
offer an organized force through which local governments can engage citizens in a number of 
ways. There is however, no guarantee that interests of the poor are represented in such 
agitations as local elites tend to identify themselves with the leadership (Devas and Grant, 
2003:309).   
 
Local Government Capacity refers to the ability of local governments to mobilize resources 
locally (See Section 80(1) of the Local Governments Act 1997. Uganda, 1997). To make 
institutions function well and hold leaders accountable is measured by: the proportion of 
locally generated revenue, human resource capacity especially in the internal audit 
department and the level of formal education which influences the ability to establish check 
on the local leaders. Accountability is about the successful collection of revenues and proper 
functioning of audit agencies, and therefore the quality of accountability depends on the 
ability of the supporting institutions to both enforce fulfilments of commitments to local 
beneficiaries (for financial accounting) and provide technical assistance and expertise 
(Melody, 2004:5 cited inKathola and Job, 2011) and balances between the political and 
bureaucratic arms of government.  The third element which is the ability to supervise the 
technical or bureaucratic staff is also important. It is based on the premise that, the local 
council, through sectoral committees has ability to supervise the technical or bureaucratic 
staff, therefore strengthen accountability. The ability to supervise bureaucratic staff is 
influenced by the level of formal education of political leadership. Formal training or 
education also influences the level of participation in sectoral committees including Local 
Government Public Accounts Committee that is mandated to scrutinize accountability at the 
local government, hence answerability.  
 
Political history which is the narrative and analysis of political events, ideas, movements, and 
leaders, according to Hegel cited in Tosh (1991), "is an idea of the state with a moral and 
spiritual force beyond the material interests of its subjects: it followed that the state was the 
108 
 
main agent of historical change. Each community had its political history. And here we 
focused on the social, economic, political and cultural conditions in the areas of study units.  
From the review of scholarly literature on both decentralisation and accountability, we draw 
the following hypotheses 
 . The more the number of communication channels such as radio, TV, website, and 
newspapers, the more accountable the local government. In other words openness of 
government and good participation depend on the presence of the media to pass this 
information. 
 The more the number of civil society groups in the local government, the higher the 
level of accountability 
 The higher proportion of revenue generated locally, the more accountable the local 
government 
 The better the capacity of human resource in internal audit of the local government, 
the higher the level of accountability.   
 The better the ability to supervise bureaucratic staff, the higher the level of 
accountability.   
 The better the more open and transparent the leadership style in local government, 
the higher the level of accountability 
7.3 Recap of the Methodology 
In order to unearth and elucidate the factors responsible for the variations, a qualitative 
methodology is adopted in this study. A comparative case study design is considered under 
the qualitative approach. Two units of analysis/cases: Entebbe Municipal Council and 
Maracha District Local Governments were purposefully selected to serve for the study. The 
methods of data collection: in-depth interviews, observation and document review as well as 
instruments used for gathering data such as the interview guide are also presented in this 
chapter. Methodological challenges of the study such as failure to get some respondents, 
which could have been a threat to the reliability of the data and the findings, are pointed out. 
The researcher however got other relevant sources such as reports and archival records and 
observation to supplement. The major methodological challenge of this study is measuring 
some of the elusive study variables. 
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7.4 Recap of the data  
Empirical evidence gathered using the in-depth interviews and other sources from the two 
Local Governments of Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District are presented 
thematically. We present the data on evidence of accountability (the dependent variable) in 
chapter four and then the findings on the decentralization (the independent variable) in the 
chapter five. We present the data from both local governments concurrently in order to bring 
out the similarities and differences, and subsequently discuss the factors behind variation in 
accountability in the selected cases. 
7.4.1 Summary of findings of the study Evidence of Accountability 
This section gives a summary of the study findings and further recommends areas for further 
study based on the findings. The research has not only theoretically but also empirically 
attempted to find out how awareness of the citizens, local government capacity and political 
history, shape the accountability actions and inactions at the local level. Theoretically, the 
study is grounded in the principal agent model, which is often used to explain how political 
and bureaucratic actors (agents) respond to the interests of their citizens (the principal) on 
whose behalf they act.  
At the empirical level, a comparative analysis is used to synthesize in-depth interview and 
documentary as well as observational evidence from the two selected local governments. 12 
respondents were interviewed. Findings indicate that, there is a close linkage between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables. The short time interval within which the 
study was conducted hold back conclusive claims. However, analysis of the empirical 
evidence at hand indicate that it is possible to draw meaningful inferences from the data 
collected within the time frame. The researcher therefore recommends more detailed study 
perhaps with mixed method approaches to benefit from triangulation. It is nevertheless not 
too early to say the findings are a reflection of a broader accountability challenge in local 
governments. This section therefore is a discussion of the summary the findings of the study. 
This is followed by recommendations based on the finding of the study 
7.4.1.1 Transparency  
In as far as openness of local governments is concerned, even with the passage of the Access 
to information Act in Uganda in 2005, government departments, local governments inclusive, 
do not avail the required information to their citizens. Local government revenue and 
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expenditure information continue to be secretively kept, in the name of confidentiality. 
Citizens do not have adequate access to internal revenue and expenditure reports, yet they are 
expected to voice their discontent to institutions such as Inspectorate of Government in case 
of corruption. Work plans, and municipal or district tendering processes are flawed and the 
fraud is discretely kept to the ‘lucky’ few. In relative terms however, Entebbe Municipal 
Council has better measures of communicating to the public through notice boards, where 
some of the above mentioned information can be viewed. It is therefore (in my view) 
important that, if the desire to have accountable decentralized local governments is to be 
achieved, strong measures of opening up local governments to the citizens should be fostered. 
This can be done by providing the necessary information that the citizens need to know. This 
openness is only functional through people friendly communication mechanisms. This 
assertion is supported by the testimonial evidence from Maracha District that, most of the 
communication mechanisms are not appropriate as most people do not have access to them.  
7.4.1.2 Participation  
Participation entails different mechanisms for the citizens or the public to express their 
opinions and in fact, exert influence on political, economic, management or other social 
decisions. Participation in the light of local government accountability entails citizens’ 
involvement in local council elections. During the study, we found out that, in as much as 
there are regular local council elections, real participation is not evident in Uganda’s local 
governments. There is little evidence of leadership change as a result of political and social 
activism. The only ‘tool’ in the hands of the citizens to regulate their leaders is the vote. They 
can use the vote to fight corrupt leaders. A complexity however arises from the fact that, 
more that 80 percent of the country is impoverished. Many people living in Maracha District, 
are choking with poverty, therefore making it easy for corrupt leaders to ‘buy their way out,’ 
and ascend onto political thrones.  In relative terms, Entebbe Municipal Council voters seem 
to make use of their ‘tool’ by voting rather well. Almost all the councilors in the previous 
council did not come back as opposition Democratic Party won majority of the Municipality 
Council seats in 2011. This followed the announcement of Entebbe as the best Upper Local 
Government the previous year on the backdrop of corruption allegations levelled against the 
bureaucratic leadership. The Entebbe Council is inconclusively multiparty with all the major 
political parties represented, unlike the case in Maracha, which only has members from  
Movement party. Civil society organisations in Entebbe are also in their hundreds against 
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Maracha’s eight. These CSOs/CBOs not only provide opportunities for people to participate 
in the councils activities but also sharpen the awareness of the citizens about their rights to 
access information and demand for accountability from their leaders.  
Testimonial evidence also indicated the existence of village meetings in Entebbe, at least for 
budgeting purposes and there were no such initiative in Maracha. My view is that, for 
accountability to thrive, participation needs to be fostered. And this can only be possible 
through an informed population, who can use their influence and negotiation power through 
community based organisations. It is therefore important to promote the growth of these 
organisations. 
7.4.1.3 Complaints and response mechanisms 
Mechanisms to register complaints against public officers are clearly laid out in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995; The Inspectorate of Government Act 2002, 
and The Local governments Act 1997, but the effectiveness of these procedures are found to 
vary across local governments. The Entebbe Municipal Council Town is reported to have 
failed to answer questions before the Parliaments Public Accounts Committee, concerning 
unaccounted for money worth 35,000 US dollars. At the same time, a poor peasant who was 
awarded the same amount of money by court for the Maracha District Council forcefully 
taking over his land for building a new sub county headquarters, but no action has since been 
taken by the relevant bodies to help the aggrieved peasant farmer. 
In Maracha some of the respondents made accusations against political leaders, that the 
leaders were acting outside their powers by attempting to remove bureaucratic staff from 
office. Not much information was revealed (to the researcher) on the kind of accusation being 
levelled against the bureaucratic staff by some of the political leaders, but such allegations 
that the political leaders are not totally ignorant as some people argued. What perhaps in my 
view needs to be looked into is how to organise these communication mechanisms and make 
them more people friendly. 
7.4.2 Revisiting the independent variables 
In this section we return to the independent variables in order to summarise the major 
empirical evidences namely: citizens’ awareness, local government capacity and political 
history,  and to explain how these variables impacted on the level of transparency, 
112 
 
participation and complaints and response mechanisms in the selected local governments. 
The two components of empirical evidence and explanation of causal relations are presented 
concurrently.   
7.4.2.1 Citizens’ awareness 
Citizens’ awareness entails people’s knowledge about accountability at the local government. 
The media plays a critical role in spreading information. Similarly, civil society organizations 
also provide an opportunity for the citizens to participate besides being agents of mass 
education and communication. We therefore use variety of communication mechanisms and 
number of CSOs and CBOs as indicators of citizens’ awareness.  
Testimonial evidence show that Entebbe Municipal Council uses a number of communication 
mechanisms and these include: office messengers, radios, television, national newspapers, 
local newspapers, notice boards and ward (community) budget meetings as the main 
communication mechanisms. The municipality also maintains a website 
http://entebbemc.com/ which is used to post useful information, though not much of this is 
accountability related In Maracha District; the communication mechanisms used are radios 
and notice boards. During data collection in EMC, we were able to observe accountability 
related information such as annual financial statements advertisement and awarded tenders on 
the notice boards. In contrast, the notice boards in Maracha had almost no information apart 
from a few announcements from the departments. No accountability related information was 
observed.  
EMC also has the statistical Abstract, which gives detailed report on the performance of each 
department. The reports include annual revenue and expenditure, summary of the number of 
institutions audited and a list of all the CBOs and CSOs operating in the district. According to 
information obtained from the Municipal Council Statistical Abstract. Information from the 
abstract EMC (2010:44) indicates that municipality the following number of organizations  
CBOs-510, NGOs 19, SACCOS 09, Private Organizations 100, Government Departments 23, 
Total 661 (EMC, 2010:44). This contrasts   Maracha District’s total number of both CBOs 
and NGOs which is only 16. These organisations according to respondents in both local 
governments play an important role in empowering people, through sensitization and mass 
mobilisation, which gives them negotiation power as a block, therefore strengthening 
accountability. It is therefore this sharp contrast in the number of variety of communication 
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channels and the number of CBOs and NGOs that explains why there is variation in 
accountability across local governments. 
7.4.2.2 Local Government Capacity 
Here, we consider three indicators for local government capacity namely: proportion of local 
government revenue generated locally, human resource capacity in internal audit department 
and ability to supervise. Our findings indicate that Entebbe Municipal Council’s 17% of total 
budget comes from local collections, 83% of the total income is remitted by the Central 
government, The Municipality boasts of 84% revenue collection rate while Maracha 
District’s 1% of total revenue is from local collections, 99% from Central government, and 
Revenue collection rate of the district is only 30 percent. This means the district can collect 
only 30 percent of the revenue budgeted. Here the key argument is that, citizens can easily 
ask for accountability for funds they are aware of and in most cases, this is what they directly 
contribute to than what comes from the central government. The explanation behind this is 
the second assumption of the agency model, that often agents have more information than 
their principals. This difference in local revenue collection therefore explains why there is 
better accountability in Entebbe Municipal Council than Maracha District. 
On human resource capacity in internal audit department we observed that, Entebbe 
Municipality is composed of 100% approved posts, 84% filled posts and 16% vacant posts in 
the respective departments. In the F/Y2009/010, two lower local government units and 8 
departments at the municipality headquarters were audited. There were also 14 schools and 4 
health units audited in the same period of time. Maracha District on the other hand is 
composed of 100 % approved posts, 36 % filled posts and 64 % vacant posts. The internal 
audit department has only one staff compared to Entebbe’s 5 staff. This therefore hinders 
accountability especially in other departments and the lower local governments where most 
of the money is spent. This is because there is laxity as the officials see no third person 
checking their accountability. Testimonial evidence from the Maracha district highlighted 
carelessness in attaching receipts to reports among the accountability challenges, attributing it 
to low human resource capacity. 
The ability to supervise is closely linked to the level of formal education of the councilors. 
We established that almost all the councilors in Entebbe are graduates. On the other hand in 
Maracha, the only graduate on the council is the LC V chairman. This low level of formal 
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schooling in Maracha, according to one respondent, has led to what he referred to as lack of 
knowledge on how to handle government business and erroneous decision making by the 
council. Therefore the bureaucratic staff do not take the politicians seriously. This in turn is 
reflected in poor performance of institutions such as Local Government Public Accounts 
Committee. The problem here is that technical staff undermine the ability of their political 
counterparts to supervise them. Entebbe Municipal Councilors actively participate in council 
meetings, sectoral committee meetings and they are thorough on accountability. The Town 
clerk and his team were even forwarded to the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee for 
failure to adequately account for funds. The capacity of the local government therefore has 
close linkage to the procedures for registering complaints and the mechanisms for receiving 
feedback. 
7.4.2.3 Political History 
Our analysis is focused on the traditional cultural aspects of leadership. We borrow a few 
aspects from Jamil’s analysis of administrative culture.  Jamil (2002) argues that, a study of 
administrative culture has to incorporate not only the internal context of public administration 
such as bureaucrats’ attitudes towards work and their place of work, but also the external 
context, i.e. bureaucracy’s relationship to politics and society in general.  
 
Scholars have further argued that in many developing countries, bureaucrats regard citizens 
as ‘subjects’ who are expected to show ‘creeping’ behavior, i.e. respect and compliance to 
administrators. The interactions between administrators and voluntary organizations or 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have evolved out of different political, social and 
cultural contexts, and have taken different patterns in different countries (Selle and Kuhnle, 
1992, p. 1) cited in Jamil (2002). Such relations therefore influence accountability relations 
between leaders and their followers. It therefore offers us the basis to explain variation in 
accountability in the selected local governments.  
 
First we consider the narrative and analysis of political events, ideas, movements, and 
leadership of the local government. Our main variable is therefore leadership. Looking at the 
political history of each local government under study, Entebbe municipality obtained its 
name from the Luganda word “Entebbe‟ (denotating “seat” or “chair”) which consign the 
rock seats on the seashore of Lake Victoria which were carved by Mugula, a Muganda 
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traditional Chief in the early 18th century. Entebbe was capital city of Uganda in 1894 
following a decision in 1893 by the colonial Governor Sir Gerald Portal to relocate from 
Kampala to Entebbe. On the other hand, Maracha District was created in 2009/10 financial 
year and started operations in from 1
st
 July 2010/11 financial year. It was a Reward for 
support to the ruling government.  
The strong leadership foundations perhaps point to the fact that Entebbe Municipal Council 
gas had a long tradition of answerability embedded in hereditary kingship. This is contrary to 
the Lugbara tradition where people elected leaders for particular functions, therefore having 
less cumbersome lines of accountability.  
 
We further look at response to accountability which, like any other change processes is 
determined by the dynamic forces in the Local governments. Leadership is one of these 
factors. Since government reform processes are expected to reduce rent-seeking 
opportunities, leaders are expected to be opposed by groups of actors that benefit from 
incomplete accountability. Simply put, political elites will oppose incentives to protect their 
rent-seeking opportunities. Empirical evidence show mixed results. 
Although it is difficult to directly link leadership to local accountability, testimonial evidence 
showed that there was a close relation between leadership and openness, promotion of 
information dissemination, promotion of civil society and political will to prosecute 
offenders.  Respondents in both Entebbe Municipal Council and Maracha District 
underscored the importance of leadership, and indeed argued that leadership matters in 
facilitating accountability. Variation in accountability therefore is a matter of the extent to 
which leaders commit themselves to see change in accountability.    
7.5 Recommendations 
This study is an exposure to the existing challenges facing local governments in Uganda. In 
view of the findings, I would like to make a few observations and recommendations that 
would help improve accountability at local governments. 
 First, in Uganda like elsewhere, communications mechanisms vary. Urban centres 
tend to have better ways of communicating to the people. These include radio, 
television among others. The challenge that emerge is that in the rural areas, most 
people do not have access to information. Therefore in order to improve 
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accountability across local governments, the central government should make a 
deliberate effort to have citizens access information that befits them, through 
subsidizing radio receivers, which are a common means of communication otherwise 
the laws remain rhetoric. 
 Secondly, civil society organisations play an important role in empowering the 
population in two ways. First through sensitizing the masses about their right to know 
and secondly by giving them the negotiation power through collective voice. The 
challenge with most civil society organisations in Uganda is that, many receive 
funding through government. These funds pass through government officials and 
these same officials are expected to be answerable to the citizens. In most cases, 
government officials control the information that reach down to the citizens, therefore 
making it hard for the citizens to get access to information as the corrupt elites tend to 
filter the kind of information that should trickle down to the masses. It is therefore 
important to have CSOs and CBOs whose operations are not regulated by local 
government leadership if accountability is to be achieved. 
 The issue of local government capacity poses a challenge on two fronts: First, most 
local governments are poorly funded and even the little funds come in late. The 
problem is aggregated by the fact that most of the local governments have poor local 
revenue base. This makes it difficult for the citizens to hold their leaders accountable 
as they do not even have the necessary information about the revenue and 
expenditure. In short, they cannot know whether the local government has money or 
not, how it is received and spent, when they have not directly contributed to it. 
Therefore it would be more feasible, in my view, to have larger local governments 
who can sustain themselves and gain comparative economic advantage. This would 
mean calling for reinstating regional local governments, which are stronger with 
better local revenue base. The second challenge is the low human resource capacity. 
This especially affects the newly created local governments as they cannot recruit new 
staff without Public Service Approval. All these take place in a country where 
decentralization policy is a means of creating new positions for staff, while the 
government is failing to pay decent salary to the serving staff and depriving the retired 
civil servants of their retirement benefits. A deeper look at a comprehensive 
government reform would be very important. 
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 In some of the local governments, there is clearly lack of adequate capacity of the 
population to hold their leadership accountable. A lot of people have low literacy 
levels, therefore the ‘educated’ elite do not take their ‘supervisors’ serious as they 
consider them unknowledgeable. In Maracha District for instance, there were 
revelations that the politicians have low levels of formal education and therefore lack 
experience in handling government business. With such attitudes, accountability is 
hard to enforce. 
 Political history of the local government also play important role in accountability. 
Here we find the role played by leadership and historical origins as core in facilitating 
or failing accountability. An impoverished population cannot stand up and demand for 
accountability. Self seeking local government officials tend to ‘buy off’ the citizens in 
case they are found to be corrupt. This deprives the rest (majority) of the citizens of 
their benefits. Therefore reform policies aimed at empowering people would be the 
solution. The challenge however is that, impoverishment is a measure devised by the 
government officials to prevent citizens from keeping them (the government officials) 
in check. 
7.6 Some Policy Implications of the study 
Beyond the intellectual worth of this study, it is expected that, the findings of this study will 
significantly contribute to better understanding of local government accountability dynamics. 
There are multiple actors who might be interested in crafting consequential interventions to 
enhance local government accountability. National governments, civil society, local 
government bureaucrats, local political leadership as well as international donors might find 
the results of this study appealing to obtain expected outcomes in delivering accountability 
policies to local governments. 
The study findings further illuminated the complexity of interactions at the local level. It 
clearly brings out the fact that government relations are not just rooted in proper design of 
local government structures. Therefore policies should be broad in outlook, but not narrow if 
the desired outcomes are to be achieved. For this reason, particular attention needs to be paid 
to broader involvement of citizens at the local level. It is therefore clear that, besides the 
fiscal and political resources, there is need to redesign mechanisms to ensure better 
participation of citizens at the local level. These desired outcomes range from strengthening 
people-friendly information channels, strengthening civil society participation, strengthening 
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participatory political engagement at the local level, encouraging pro-reform leadership, 
ensuring all local governments operate with the desired human resource levels  and more 
importantly promote local and pro-people accountability initiatives. In all this the dangers of 
‘one size fits all’ should be avoided as variations in accountability across local governments 
could simply signify difference in what people perceive to be accountability. 
 The counsel of this investigation is hoped to enhance public sector accountability dynamics 
at the local level, especially decentralising settings. In Uganda like elsewhere, the 
relationship between government and citizens is changing. These range from sub-government 
innovations to directly impact on citizens lives to national legislation and constitutional 
changes to foster better accountability.  For this reason, Uganda’s local government seems to 
be re-centralising certain aspects of government. Whichever way the changes, it is ultimately 
the government and people to choose the reform path to pursue. 
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7 APPENDIX 
Appendix 1:  List of Respondents 
1. Commissioner Local Council Development 
2. Town Clerk/ Chief Administrative officer 
3. Mayor/LC V Chairperson 
4. Chief Finance Officer/Treasurer to the Council 
5. Speaker to the council/District Speaker 
6. Internal Auditor 
7. Economist/Principal Planner 
8. Personnel Officer 
9. Councilors 2 
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Appendix 2:  Information to Respondents 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
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Appendix 4: Theme List/Interview Guide 
1. Understanding of decentralization in general 
2. Understanding of accountability 
3. Whose interests do leaders serve? 
4. Transparency 
a. Access to accountability information, revenue and expenditure etc 
5. Participation 
a. Evidence of leadership change 
b. Political party representation 
c. Meeting attendance 
d. CBOs /CSOs 
6. Complaints and response mechanisms 
a. Knowledge of Procedures for complaints 
i. IGG, LGPAC 
ii.  
b. Knowledge of mechanisms for response 
7. Citizen Awareness 
a. Number of communication mechanisms 
b. Number of CBOs/CSOs 
8. Local Government Capacity 
a. Locally Generated revenue 
b. HR Capacity 
c. Levels of formal education 
9. Political History 
a. General Information about the Local Government 
b. Leadership 
10. Major Achievements 
11. Major Challenges 
12. Any other suggestions 
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Appendix 6: Application for Permit to National Council for Science and Technology 
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Appendix 7: Permission from National Council for Science and Technology 
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Appendix 8:  Research Permit from Office of the President 
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Appendix 9: Application for Permission from Ministry of Local Government 
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Appendix 10: Permission for Research Entebbe Municipal Council 
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Appendix 11: Permission for Research Maracha District 
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Appendix 12: Location of Entebbe Municipal Council in Uganda 
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Appendix 13: Villages of Entebbe Municipal Council 
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Appendix 14: Location of Maracha District in Uganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
